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ABOUT THIS REPORT     
 
The government of Swaziland denies its people basic human rights and conditions necessary for 
making a living, raising their children and escaping an early death. Swazis and their rich cultural 
heritage are at extreme risk due to the greed and depredations of their king, who is Africa’s last 
absolute monarch. This report sets out the critical issues affecting Swaziland and recommends 
approaches for key stakeholders. Apart from generating discussion amongst those directly 
involved with the movement for democracy is Swaziland, this report is also intended to serve as 
a fact sheet for those who are new to Swaziland’s issues.  
                                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cover Image: Sikhuphe Airport, one of King Mswati’s ‘vanity projects’, is located in a 
wilderness area 80 km from the closest urban center. Construction started 9 years ago, and the 
airport was initially projected to cost USD 84 million. Criticized for irresponsible use of public 
funds, the government defended the project saying it would increase tourism and generate tax 
income to help alleviate poverty. In 2013, the airport is still at least 3 years from being 
operational. Currently, the Swazi Finance Ministry admits to cumulative government expenditure 
on the airport totaling USD 315 million, and the cost is still rising. No commercial flight has ever 
landed at Sikhuphe, and a government engineer has found the runway to be defective. The 
airport is believed to be a vehicle for channeling government money into high level pockets. 
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KEY DATES  
1903 British establish rule over Swaziland and the Transvaal 
1944 Britain declares Sobhuza II as Native Authority in Swaziland  
1964 Sobhuza II forms his own party, the Imbokodvo National Movement 
6 September 1968 Swaziland becomes independent within the Commonwealth and adopts a 
new constitution 
12 April 1973 Sobhuza II issues a proclamation rescinding the constitution, banning 
political parties and allocating all powers to the king 
1978  A new constitution enshrines electoral representation by tinkhundla, 
constituencies of between 5 and 10 chiefdoms 
21 August 1982 King Sobhuza dies at age 83 without a designated heir 
1983 PUDEMO is founded by mostly students and other youth 
25 April 1986 Makhosetive is installed as King Mswati III 
1992 PUDEMO announces it is unbanning itself 
1996  King Mswati announces a constitutional review commission  
November 2002  Mswati buys a $45m jet despite parliament cancelling the order  
August 2005 After 8 years work, King Mswati signs a new constitution; the king is 
placed above all laws and there is no role foreseen for political parties 
September 2008 A bomb explodes 1 km from the king’s principal palace 
November 2008 PUDEMO, SWAYOCO, SSN and other groups are proscribed as terrorist 
organizations under a new Suppression of Terrorism Act 
April 2011  Police crack down on opposition ahead of planned demonstrations for 
political reform 
November 2011  Swaziland is hit by a budget crisis described by the IMF as ‘critical’, with 
the government struggling to pay salaries 
April 2012  TUCOSWA’s registration is annulled 
August 2013      King Mswati announces that God instructed him via a lightning bolt from 
a clear sky to rename Swaziland’s government system as ‘Monarchical 
Democracy’ 
20 September 2013 Elections for the Swazi House of Assembly 
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KEY FIGURES 
1.2 million Swaziland’s population 
19.82 years Median age of Swaziland’s population 
40%   Swaziland government’s estimate of unemployment 
50% Estimated unemployment of Swazis between 16 and 24 years old 
75%   Portion of Swaziland’s population dependent on subsistence farming 
48 years  Average life expectancy in Swaziland 
80%   Portion of the population who die before attaining 40 years 
29% Portion of the population infected with HIV 
USD 28 million Swaziland’s annual health care budget (around USD 23 per person) 
486% Year on year increase in 2012 – 13 budgetary allocation for security 
equipment and supplies purchases 
USD 3362 Swaziland’s gross national income per capita 
4 to 1 Difference between incomes of urban and rural Swazis 
18% Government wage bill as a % of Swaziland’s GDP – highest in Africa 
USD 92 million Annual loss to GDP from the effects on the work force of chronic hunger 
in childhood 
60%   Portion of Swaziland’s economy controlled by King Mswati 
USD 128 million Swaziland government funds lost to corruption in 2012 
55 Number of tinkhundla, Swaziland’s electoral constituencies. Each of the 
tinkhundla includes between 5 and 10 chiefdoms 
700 thousand Number of Swazis who use mobile phones 
90% Portion of the Swazi population who are Christians 
60% Drop in SACU transfers to Swaziland from 2008 to 2011 
USD 200 million King Mswati’s estimated personal wealth 
11 Number of Mswati’s palaces in Swaziland 
27 Number of Mswati’s children 
14 Number of Mswati’s wives and ex-wives 
40 Number of years during which the Swazi kings have prohibited political 
parties from participating in elections 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Swaziland is a little-known country of 1.2 million people where the government has popularized 
photos of beautiful girls performing traditional dances for the king. These images both attract 
tourists and distract outsiders from Swaziland’s shocking realities of oppression, abject poverty, 
hunger and disease. In actuality, Swaziland is a country in crisis where even the traditional 
culture risks extinction due to the absolute monarch’s malfeasance. In our contemporary 
understanding of governance, no  leader can have comprehensive immunity no matter what he 
does – seizing private and public property for his personal benefit, kidnapping pretty girls, 
imprisoning citizens who displease him and ordering assassinations. However under Swaziland’s 
laws the king is immune from civil suits and criminal prosecution1, and he can commit crimes 
with impunity. He is also the only judge of Swaziland’s highest court of appeal. 
 
Although the Swazi government boasts trappings of a modern state – a constitution and 
legislative, executive and judicial branches – the monarch, King Mswati III, chooses and controls 
all significant office bearers. These must obey his commands at all times. Elections occur, but 
political parties are banned from participating.2 In the elections of September 2013, this ban will 
again ensure that the ‘winners’ will be fully under the king’s control.   
 
Trade unions previously enjoyed some influence, but more recently the national trade union 
congress has been officially ‘deregistered’.3 Civil society activists must operate within 
constraints on rights of assembly, dissemination of information and public protest.  Over the 45 
years since independence, civil society has supported the institution of the monarchy but with 
constitutional restraints. However, as the present king increasingly has departed from Swazi 
kings’ traditional responsibility to care for their subjects’ welfare in favor of his own self-
enrichment, opinion on continuing the monarchy in any form has divided.4  
 
The Swazi government’s budget has been largely funded by the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) which in some years has provided as much as 75 per cent of all government 
revenues. Perhaps as a result, the king has not learned fiscal discipline and has neglected the 
country’s economic development. As SACU receipts fell by almost 60 per cent between 2008 
and 2011, the government nearly ran out of funds to pay government employees’ salaries. The 
king came under pressure from street protesters and international donors to implement economic 
reforms and allow representative government.5 Mswati rejected calls for reform and responded to 
street protesters with beatings and detentions. Subsequently, the king increased the numbers of 
police and soldiers and beefed up their stocks of combat equipment causing fears that more 
repression rather than reform is the king’s plan for the future.  
Human rights reports on Swaziland have cited serious abuses including killings by security 
forces; torture and beatings of pro-democracy activists; arbitrary arrests and interference with 
individuals’ privacy; restrictions on freedoms of speech, assembly, association and movement; 
prohibitions on political activity and harassment of activists, labor leaders and journalists.6 
 
Most Swazis do not have access to international media, and domestic media are controlled by the 
king who personally owns one of the country’s 2 newspapers. The editor of the other newspaper 
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is in the king’s employ. With the exception of a television station devoted to religious programs, 
radio and television are government departments under the king’s control. South African 
newspapers entering Swaziland are carefully screened. If an edition contains information that is 
unfavorable to the king or the government, the government purchases and destroys all copies.7 
 
An elite 10 per cent of Swazis accounts for nearly half of total consumption. The king’s personal 
fortune is estimated at USD 200 million, and he controls 60 per cent of the country’s economy. 
In 2012, the finance minister admitted that government corruption was annually channeling USD 
128 million in public funds to the elite. The 2012 national budget allocated USD 26 million for 
royal allowances. The king also draws funds from ministry budgets at will.  
 
Unemployment, officially at 40 per cent, and under-employment are chronic problems. Around 
75 per cent of Swazis attempt to gain a living from subsistence agriculture, many in areas where 
human settlement is too dense for successful subsistence farming. Swaziland has the world’s 
highest rate of HIV infection, and there are 200,000 orphans and vulnerable children, many of 
whom have no adult care givers. Yet for 2013–14, the government budgeted USD 28 million for 
health care for 1.2 million people - only a little more than USD 23 per person.8  
 
The compromised health conditions of the Swazi people contribute decisively to a vicious cycle 
of poverty, hunger, sickness and early death. According to World Health Organization (WHO) 
data, Swazis have a life expectancy of 48 years, placing Swaziland near the bottom of statistics 
for all countries. 29 per cent of Swazi children under the age of 5 years are stunted. This is not a 
new problem; stunting has plagued the Swazi population for so long that sizeable numbers of 
adults are physically unable to perform the hard labor of subsistence farming due to the effects of 
under-nutrition which they experienced as children. 66 per cent of Swazis are unable to meet 
their basic food needs, and 43 per cent live in chronic poverty.9 Levels of impoverishment and 
joblessness will continue to increase as ever larger numbers of the burgeoning youth cohort 
attempt to find employment and encounter economic stagnation. 
 
Rural extended family structures are breaking down under the burden of the social effects of 
disease epidemics: caring for the sick, financing burial of the dead, the absence of breadwinners 
and families headed by children or the elderly. Rural communities are experiencing a major 
structural deformation due to the lack of parents who can teach the young how to obtain life 
support from the land. The loss of knowledge about planting, tending, and harvesting crops; 
caring for and using draught animals and building and repairing traditional houses and animal 
pens is exacerbating already severe poverty and further increasing flows of indigent rural people 
into peri-urban shanty towns with related problems of breakdown of families, increased spread of 
diseases, substance abuse and rising criminality.  
 
This desperate economic and social situation is the product of 40 years of incompetent and 
unrepresentative government. In that time, 2 despots have used Swaziland for their personal 
purposes while ignoring the needs of the Swazi people and their legitimate rights to have a say 
over how they are governed and how the country’s resources are used. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
For Swazi civil society 
 
• Swazi civil society should set the agenda for democratic change in Swaziland. Swazi 
democrats must prepare for a long, hard struggle by building support for their mission 
among international organizations, foreign governments and organizations, media, 
businesses, professional and advocacy organizations and people of global note. Given the 
expected repeat of a government financial crisis, civil society should prepare to gain the 
full range of political and public relations advantages which the next financial crisis will 
offer. 
• Civil society organizations with different political, religious or philosophical groundings 
should adopt an attitude of respectfully disagreeing while being able to form tactical 
alliances when these can help them move forward toward democratic goals.  
 
• Civil society should begin now to lead the Swazi people in defining the reforms they 
want and the process that they favor in order to achieve them. Civil society should also 
make the message of democracy and human rights relevant to all Swazis by substantially 
expanding efforts to connect with Swazis in all regions and economic groups. 
• Swazi civil society should get ready for pro-active engagement with the king. 
Engagement might not happen soon, but when it does, civil society must be ready to seize 
the initiative. Civil society should resist any attempt to impose a change process from 
above either by the king or SADC and the AU. If Swaziland becomes the subject of an 
imposed reform process, civil society should demand parity of representation with the 
Swazi government, should only join after receiving a mandate from the Swazi people and 
should enter the process with well elaborated proposals for genuine reforms. 
• Of critical importance, Swazi civil society should insist on neutralization of all 
government security forces prior to agreeing to enter into negotiations. 
• The sizeable investments in Swaziland of Coca Cola, Cadbury Chocolates and the 
Rhodes Food Group benefit from royal protection and provide the king with income. 
Civil society should examine these companies with a view toward either recruiting the 
companies as supporters for democracy and human rights or exploiting the companies’ 
royal connections for advocacy purposes and for channeling pressure for reform through 
the companies to the king. 
• International attention focused on Swaziland around the September 2013 elections offers 
civil society opportunities to address multiple audiences. Given the non-compliance of 
Swazi elections with Commonwealth standards, civil society should request a 
Commonwealth review of Swaziland’s eligibility for continued membership. Civil 
society should work through African networks to preclude SADC and the AU from 
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endorsing Swaziland’s sham elections. And civil society should deluge the international 
media with election related data and images. 
• King Mswati habitually watches CNN, Sky News, BBC and Al Jazeera. Civil society 
should continuously provide information about Swaziland to these organizations to make 
sure the king sees that people everywhere know the problems his rule has caused for the 
Swazi people.  
For the king 
• King Mswati should begin to create relationships of trust with the Swazi people by 
revoking oppressive laws, stopping the looting of public coffers, releasing political 
prisoners, allowing political exiles to safely return, respecting Swazis’ human rights and 
allowing pro-democracy groups, political parties and trade unions – including 
TUCOSWA - to organize and communicate freely with all Swazis.   
• The king should set his own financial interests aside in promoting the development and 
expansion of the Swazi economy in order to build a foundation for the well-being of 
Swazis.  
• The king should ensure that Swazi working people and businesses will continue to 
benefit after 2014 under the African Growth and Opportunity Act by instituting requisite 
human rights and governance reforms.  
• The king should agree without pre-conditions to participate as an equal party with the 
Swazi people in negotiations to bring about accountable governance, the rule of law, 
respect for people’s rights and allocation of national resources in the interest of the entire 
nation.   
For SADC and the international community 
 
• Foreign governments, most notably the governments of Swaziland’s closest neighbors, 
and regional and international organizations should provide all possible support  for the 
implementation of the foregoing recommendations. 
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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SWAZILAND’S DICTATORSHIP 
King Sobhuza’s coup 
Following 66 years of colonial rule, Swaziland became independent in September 1968. Leading 
up to independence, the UK administration introduced a Westminster style constitution providing 
for multiple political parties, a parliament modeled on the European prototype and a civilian 
executive to be formed by the majority party. Unwritten Swazi traditional law, which had 
operated in the colonial period parallel to the colonial administration’s legal system, was left 
intact. Although colonial rule bequeathed no tradition of democracy to Swaziland, the new 
constitution offered a platform on which Swaziland could have initiated and nurtured democratic 
institutions.  
The elderly Swazi king, Sobhuza II, mistrusted political parties and constitutional government, 
which he viewed as foreign imports incompatible with Swazi tradition.10 However in the final 
years of the colonial period, Sobhuza moved to protect the monarchy’s interests by organizing 
his own political party, the Imbokodvo National Movement11 which won all 24 parliamentary 
seats in pre-independence elections. Then, in the first post-independence elections, held in May 
1972, the king’s party received nearly 75% of the vote while another party, the Ngwane National 
Liberatory Congress (NNLC), won 20%, giving the party 3 seats. The NNLC leadership was 
made up of urban intellectuals most of whom favored continuation of the monarchy under a 
constitution. Sobhuza panicked, viewing the NNLC’s small incursion into his power base as a 
significant threat.12 In April 1973, he issued a proclamation revoking Swaziland’s constitution, 
outlawing political parties, exempting the monarchy from legal accountability and granting the 
king absolute authority over all branches of government. The proclamation’s core paragraph 
stated: ‘Now THEREFORE I, SOBHUZA II, King of Swaziland, hereby declare that, in 
collaboration with my Cabinet Ministers and supported by the whole nation, I have assumed 
supreme power in the Kingdom of Swaziland and that all Legislative, Executive and Judicial 
power is vested in myself.’ The full text of the proclamation is Annex 3. 
In revoking Swaziland’s democratic constitution, Sobhuza almost certainly had the support of 
the South African government.13  At that time, South Africa and western countries favored 
conservative African dictatorships which they viewed as bulwarks against the rise of socialist 
and nationalist political parties which were suspected of subservience to the USSR and China.   
Sobhuza’s coup was a bolt from the blue. In 1973, there was no internal or external threat to the 
Swazi government and conditions throughout the country were calm. It is likely that the king was 
motivated in staging the coup by fears that an opposition party might eventually grow to threaten 
the power of his Dlamini clan to control Swaziland’s sources of wealth and to rule Swazis as 
they saw fit. Thus began a feudal dictatorship which now, 40 years later, is Africa’s last absolute 
monarchy. In that period, Swaziland’s anti-modern government, presided over by an 
unaccountable elite, has thwarted the country’s development with devastating consequences for 
most Swazis. 
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By 1973, Sobhuza II had spent 7 decades at the pinnacle of the Swazi 
chieftainship structure. He was expert in wielding power according to 
Swazi tradition which holds that ‘a king is a king by and for his 
people’.14 Sobhuza cultivated an image of a good father who protects 
and cares for his children. Nevertheless, Sobhuza did not hesitate to use 
his power to accrue gain for himself, his 65 wives and 100 children and 
a multitude of Dlamini kinfolk. However, during Sobhuza’s reign, the 
monarch eschewed a lavish lifestyle that would have distanced the king 
and his court from Swazi commoners. Such discretion has not been the 
style of Sobhuza’s successor.15 
Mswati’s troubled accession 
Sobhuza II died in 1982 leaving no designated heir and conditions rife 
for intrigues and rivalries.  Sobhuza named as Regent Queen Dzeliwe, 
an elder royal with a reputation for intelligence and high principles. The 
regent was soon engulfed by conflict as various senior princes vied for 
influence over selection of the successor. Although Swazi history and 
tradition provided guidelines for selection of a crown prince, history 
and tradition were shunted aside as a plot unfolded to designate as heir 
Makhosetive, a 14 year old illegitimate son of Sobhuza. The plotters 
had realized that further struggles among themselves might weaken the 
Dlaminis’ hold on power, and they assumed that Makhosetive’s 
gratitude would assure them great rewards. Makhosetive’s mother, a 
former cleaner in the house of one of Sobhuza’s wives, was found in a 
Manzini working class neighborhood, separated from her non-royal 
partner and married to Sobhuza’s corpse, thus legitimizing her probably 
bewildered son. Via this bizarre sequence of events, Ntombi Tfwala, a 
one-time teenaged servant, became queen regent in 1983. Her son, 
Makhosetive, became King Mswati III in 1986.16   
Mswati was not prepared. His upbringing had not given him the 
customary socialization of a future Swazi king.17 Such socialization 
would have stressed the requirement to listen to all sides and to 
maintain equilibrium in Swazi society. Although he was sent to a 
British public school for a while before his accession to the throne, the 
greater part of Mswati’s schooling occurred at an ordinary primary 
school. At the time of his installation, Mswati was a semi-literate 
teenager, unready to wield power and chosen specifically for his 
presumed vulnerability to manipulation.  The schemers who entrusted 
Mswati with absolute power apparently did not foresee that the young 
man one day might oppose their influence and do as he liked. Mswati’s reign has been 
characterized by shameless greed for money and profound insensitivity to the sufferings of his 
subjects. He has paid scant heed to the tradition that a king is a king by and for his people.18 
 
The Royal Family 
Mswati has married 14 girls and 
women of whom 3 have fled 
Swaziland. He has 27 children. 
Officially budgeted royal 
allowances currently are USD 26 
million, but total costs of the royal 
family are top secret.  Mswati and 
his wives reside in 13 palaces, and 
the king possesses at least 62 cars 
including a luxury 
DaimlerChrysler Maybach sedan 
which cost half a million dollars. 
Recently the king acquired an MD-
87 aircraft capable of trans-
continental flights. Photos of the 
king’s automobiles and airplane 
are prohibited. The royal family 
are not strangers to scandal, both 
romantic and financial. In recent 
years two cabinet ministers have 
been caught in compromised 
circumstances with a royal wife 
and the Queen Mother while large 
sums of cash have reportedly been 
stolen by cabinet ministers, 
diplomats and royal princes. In the 
most blatant instance of theft, the 
son of the Equatorial Guinea 
dictator lost around USD 2.5 
million in cash from his hotel suite 
while he was elsewhere in the 
hotel with a group of princes and 
princesses. Surveillance cameras 
recorded the theft, but nothing 
could be done. The thieves looked 
quite similar to certain princes. 
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The meaning of absolute monarchy 
An absolute monarch holds and exercises all power within a state. For most people today, the 
concept of ‘absolute monarch’ defies comprehension. In our contemporary understanding of the 
nature of government, checks and balances are essential features which assure that no person can 
decide everything, take whatever he wants and imprison or kill whomever he wants. But in 
Swaziland, the king is immune from law and can commit crimes without fear of punishment.    
At first glance, Swaziland’s government appears to consist of the standard elements of a modern 
state. It includes a parliament, a judiciary and a cabinet supported by a civil administration. Yet 
there is no mechanism or institution of government that can limit the king’s powers. He is 
insulated from public opinion and citizen participation, and no state institution can alter his 
priorities, fight his corruption, restrict his abuse of power or challenge his authority to make 
appointments. Cabinet decisions must be synonymous with the king’s preferences. The 
parliament is devoid of any political space from which it might question the king’s expenditure 
priorities or policy decisions. Any judge, who in deciding a case impinges on a royal interest, can 
soon be dismissed.19 
2005 Constitution: semantic tricks and confused authorities 
King Sobhuza’s 1973 proclamation had the status of supreme law until 2005 when a new 
constitution came into force. For nearly 2 decades, various constitution drafting committees 
appointed by the king had attempted to find a workable compromise between absolutism and 
democracy. Absolutism won. The 2005 constitution, echoing the 1973 proclamation, elevates the 
king above the law. Legal immunity for serving heads of state is not uncommon in constitutional 
law, but it is usually accompanied by laws, regulations and practices that guard against infinite 
abuse of power. In the Swazi legal and political systems, there are no such safeguards.  
In the 2005 constitution, unwritten Swazi customary law is accorded an equal status with 
Swaziland’s version of Roman Dutch law. The UN has offered Swaziland assistance with the 
codification of Swazi customary law, but this offer has not been accepted.20 In exercising the 
powers of the chiefdom, it probably is convenient for the Dlaminis and their allies not to be 
bound by written statutes. Thus customary law relies on oral tradition and ad hoc decision 
making. In important matters, decisions are made by the king, sometimes together with his 
mother, a traditional prime minister and a royal advisory council. In matters of lesser importance, 
local chiefs decide along with their local councils. Chiefs are also permitted to make and enforce 
additional laws as they see fit. As a consequence, ordinary Swazis must contend with an 
uncertain legal framework in which people more powerful than themselves can make up the rules 
as they see fit.21 
Proscription of multi-party democracy in the 2005 constitution is more subtle than the blunt 
wording of the 1973 proclamation. Following provisions of guarantees covering internationally 
recognized human rights, the constitution states: ‘The system of government for Swaziland is a 
democratic, participatory, tinkhundla-based system which emphasizes devolution of state power 
from central government to tinkhundla areas and individual merit as a basis for election or 
appointment to public office.’22 An inkhundla (plural tinkhundla) is a voting constituency made 
up of various numbers of chiefdoms.  Swazi chiefs, who receive their authority directly from the 
king, exercise substantial powers over their subjects including the allocation of the agricultural 
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plots from which the majority of Swazis gain their livelihoods. With chiefs in control of 
elections, there can be little genuine freedom of choice.  
A second obstacle to multi-party democracy contained in the constitution is the phrase 
‘individual merit’. Swazi executive branch authorities and judges of the Supreme Court have 
decided that this provision means that only individuals, not political parties, are entitled to 
participate in elections.  
The role of the occult in sustaining royal power 
Anthropologist Hilda Kuper’s seminal research into Swazi culture conducted over 3 decades 
found that ‘the existence of witchcraft and sorcery is considered self-evident.’23 Kuper also wrote 
‘In the ancestral cult, the world of the living is projected into a world of spirits (emadloti). Men 
and women, old and young, aristocrats and commoners, continue the patterns of superiority and 
inferiority established by earthly experiences…..Although the cult is set in a kinship framework, 
it is extended to the nation through the king, who is regarded as the father of all Swazi; his 
ancestors are the most powerful of the spirits.’24 The linkage which Swazis accept between the 
living king and their dead ancestors’ spirits is the deep foundation of Swazi monarchial power. 
Good and evil in the Swazi cosmology function as a struggle between the umtsakatsi (sorcerer) 
who “undermines the status quo and the inyanga (medicine man) who struggles to maintain it. 
Wedged between the chief and the tinyanga (medicine men) on the one hand and the batsakatsi 
(sorcerers) on the other, the masses are molded to accept a relatively unenterprising 
conservatism.”25 
The 5 Swazi kings who preceded Sobhuza II all died in their prime. Kuper notes that Swazi 
tradition attributes all death to the effects of sorcery, and concern for the health and survival of 
the king has spawned elaborate ceremonies at which the king is treated with magic potions and 
spells with the purpose of strengthening the king against those who would seek to harm the king 
and the institution of the monarchy.26 
A previous US ambassador in Swaziland stated in a diplomatic report that occult practitioners, 
(tinyanga) and belief in muti, which includes charms and potions used to cast spells and curses, 
are important influences on Mswati’s conception of his role and powers.27 Musa Ndlangamandla, 
who during many years worked closely with King Mswati, said ‘At the back of Mswati’s mind, 
he knows he was not intended to be king. This might be the basis of his paranoia. The king is 
certain muti can kill him, and his life is dominated by fear. Mswati believes that he is imbued 
with a potent aura (infukwana), and part of the aura can be transferred to any person or object in 
Swaziland that he might touch. This is the reason why no Swazi may shake hands with the king. 
Also when Mswati has visited a Swazi’s home, the chair where he sat must be taken away by the 
king’s servants and destroyed. If not, the host could hire a witch to use the aura left on the chair 
to make muti and harm the king.’28 
Any suspected attempt to use muti to attack the king is taken very seriously and sets off 
procedures to sniff out and eliminate potential harm to the king. Ndlangamandla recalls a 
tediously long meeting when, as always, the king was seated in a comfortable chair and the other 
participants were seated on the floor. To alleviate his boredom, Ndlangamandla picked up a 
loose fiber from the carpet and twirled the fiber between 2 fingers. As the meeting ended, 
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Mswati ordered Ndlangamandla to stay, questioned him about the fiber and brought in a team of 
tinyanga to doctor the fiber and the place on the floor where Ndlangamandla had found it.29 
Large numbers of Swazis consider the king to be a powerful muti practitioner in his own right, 
and the king’s close association with occult practices is an important pillar of his power.30 Highly 
educated Swazi cabinet ministers crawl in the king’s presence, and many rural people drop to 
their knees when they see the flashing blue lights of an official motorcade believing the king 
might be inside one of the cars. 
Each year in December, the king enters into a month-long seclusion following the tradition of 
incwala. At a public level, incwala ceremonies commemorate the onset of the annual harvest and 
include events intended to bring together the population in seeking blessings from the spirits of 
their ancestors. Other incwala ceremonies involving cleansing and strengthening of the secluded 
king occur in deep secrecy. Only partial information about these ceremonies has leaked into the 
public domain. It is known however that during the incwala seclusion, the king must eat and 
drink without question whatever the tinyanga give him.31 In the previously quoted diplomatic 
report, the ambassador commented: “If they are unhappy with the direction the king is taking the 
country, then the king has cause to worry.”32 The present king’s grandfather, who is recalled as a 
violent and unbalanced man, is believed the have been poisoned during an incwala seclusion.33  
In 2011, a man using the name Sithembiso Simelane published online a detailed description of 
secret incwala ceremonies that he claimed to have witnessed as a royal brigade member. From a 
practical perspective, some parts of Simelane’s description defy belief. However even if only a 
part of Simelane’s bizarre and gruesome description is true, it would mean that governance in 
Swaziland is strongly influenced by a conviction that the king is constantly in danger from 
enemies seeking to use muti to control and even kill him and by the need to employ stronger muti 
to protect the king.34 
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THE DEFORMED ECONOMY AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES FOR SWAZI PEOPLE    
With a gross national income per capita of USD 3,362, Swaziland is 
classified by the World Bank in the lower middle income category. 
Other countries in the same category include Nigeria, Indonesia and 
Ukraine. Swaziland is moderately endowed with iron, hydropower, coal 
and forests in addition to small gold and diamond deposits and excellent 
soil for sugar cane cultivation. Despite these advantages, from 2005 
through 2013, except in 2009, Swaziland’s average GDP growth was 
substantially lower than the Sub-Saharan Africa regional average.35 
Wealth distribution among the 1.2 million Swazis is uneven. An elite 10 
per cent accounts for nearly half of total consumption. Forty per cent of 
Swazis are unemployed, and this figure does not take into account high 
levels of under-employment in subsistence farming.  
In 2012, the WHO Global Health Observatory36 reported that the 
median age of Swazis was 19.82 years with 38 per cent of the 
population under 15. The fertility rate of 3.4 children per woman was 
the highest in Southern African. However due to high mortality, annual 
population growth is 1 per cent. Around 75 per cent of Swazis work in 
subsistence agriculture on the 56 per cent of Swazi territory which is 
designated as Swazi Nation Land. Occupants of Swazi Nation Land do 
not have title deeds. T  he lack of tenured land ownership is a strong 
disincentive to investment and productivity.  
Tibiyo Taka Ngwane and royal family dominance of the economy 
King Mswati’s personal wealth is estimated by Forbes Magazine at 
around USD 200 million. In addition, the king controls Tibiyo Taka 
Ngwane, a fund founded by his father allegedly for purchasing 
foreigners’ interests in enterprises deemed essential to Swaziland’s 
development. Every Swazi man was required to contribute, typically 
one cow. The founding charter, although never registered, defined 
Tibiyo as a national asset held by the king in trust for all Swazis each of 
whom was deemed to be a shareholder. Income from Tibiyo’s present 
total worth of around USD 2 billion supports King Mswati, his dozen 
wives, their 27 children and those of the king’s royal kinfolk whom he 
must placate in order to preclude their doing him harm. Like Mswati, 
Tibiyo is immune from taxation, civil suits and criminal prosecution. 
Over the past 45 years, Tibiyo has exploited its official status as a 
‘Swazi national empowerment vehicle’ to acquire equity at nominal 
costs in key sectors of the Swazi economy.37  
The legal status of Tibiyo has been described as ferae naturae, a Latin 
term meaning “of a wild nature” like an animal running free in the 
forest and owned by no one. This is because Tibiyo and those who 
Tibiyo’s Stranglehold on the 
Swazi Economy 
From a survey of Tibiyo’s recent 
annual reports together with the 
reports of companies in which it 
is invested, it was possible to 
estimate that Tibiyo controls 
around 60 per cent of the Swazi 
economy. Tibiyo Agriculture 
owns more than half of the entire 
Swazi sugar industry with a 
value exceeding USD 335 
million. This includes a 53 per 
cent shareholding equity in the 
Royal Swazi Sugar Corporation, 
40 per cent of Ubombo Sugar; 
55 per cent of the Swaziland 
Sugar Association’s assets, and 
substantial lands under cane 
cultivation. Tibiyo Estate Hotels 
and Hospitality owns 40 per cent 
of Royal Swazi Sun Group, the 
largest hotel group in Swaziland, 
and 100 per cent of Royal Villas. 
Tibiyo also has major holdings 
in shopping malls, other 
commercial properties and 
housing estates. Tibiyo Mining 
owns 50 per cent of the 
Dvokolwako Diamond Mining 
Company, 25 per cent of 
Maloma Coal Mining and 80 per 
cent of Langa Brick and Tile 
Manufacturing. Tibiyo Foods 
owns 40 per cent of Swazi SAB 
breweries and 26 per cent of 
Parmalat Milk and Cheese 
Processors. Tibiyo Shipping and 
Insurance Broking owns 41 per 
cent of Alexander Forbes Risk 
Management and 35 per cent of 
Manica shipping. 
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control it cannot be held accountable by anyone or any authority. As a result of its unique status, 
Tibiyo’s dominance in Swaziland’s economy is invulnerable to competition. King Mswati 
ensures that the government’s laws and law enforcement, regulations, budgeting and contracting 
all work in Tibiyo’s favor while placing barriers against would be entrepreneurs who do not 
enjoy the king’s protection.38  
Both Sobhuza and Mswati have dispossessed village people of lands which subsequently were 
folded into Tibiyo’s business assets. One example is the sugar producing fields of the Royal 
Swaziland Sugar Corporation. These are located on highly fertile land previously occupied by 
prosperous communities which were forcibly relocated to a marginal farming area where they 
now live in poverty. Similarly, large areas in Big Bend which were developed into Tibiyo’s 
sugar cane business were acquired by King Sobhuza through forced evictions without 
compensation. Mswati has seized people’s homes, land and other properties without 
indemnifying the owners. In Swaziland, property is insecure, and rightful owners have no 
effective redress in the legal system which places the king above all laws.39 
International investors 
In promoting international investment in Swaziland, the Swazi government boasts of labor costs 
at 1/3 the level of South Africa and a calm and secure business climate.40 In an Independent 
Newspapers ‘Business Report’ issued in July 2013, 60 per cent of 400 firms chosen as a 
representative sample of the South African business community said they would not mind 
trading with Swaziland, although only 27 per cent of them do. The survey found that less than 10 
per cent of the respondents would consider investing in Swaziland. Deterrents to investment 
were said to be political instability and an uncertain economic future. Most respondents avoided 
giving more specific reasons for their reluctance to invest in Swaziland. However one banker 
probably spoke for many when he said: “We can’t openly discuss what is keeping Swaziland 
down, because it is governance. People are terrified to talk for fear of being labelled traitors and 
terrorists, which is what this government does with its critics, no matter how well meaning.”41 
Foreign companies wishing to enter Swaziland must bribe King Mswati with shares or cash in 
varying amounts depending on the potential for profitability of the proposed venture and the new 
business’s possible impact on Mswati’s own business interests. In return, investors who remain 
in good standing with the king can receive protection from competition.42  
The MTN saga, which is covered in detail in Annex 5, is an illustrative example of the extent to 
which the king will go to promote the profitability of a venture in which he has a stake. To boost 
MTN’s profits, the state owned mobile phone operation, which offered Swazis lower rates than 
MTN, was put out of business by the prime minister acting in cahoots with the king. A month 
before the MTN scandal erupted into public view, 25 year old Princess Sikhanyiso Dlamini, 
King Mswati’s eldest daughter, was appointed to MTN Swaziland’s board of directors. A 
Swaziland based investment consultant commented:  ‘All big companies in Swaziland have to 
accommodate royal family members to their boards. The princess’s appointment signals that the 
time has come for a new generation to enjoy that privilege.’43 
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The Swazi government’s financial crisis 
Swaziland, along with 4 other Southern African countries44, is a member of the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), a mechanism through which South Africa channels de facto economic 
assistance to its neighbors.  In some years, SACU’s annual transfers amounted to as much as 75 
per cent of Swaziland’s government revenues. Dependency on SACU allowed Swazi kings to 
ignore needs for fiscal discipline and economic development which would have increased the 
domestic tax base and could have improved the life conditions of ordinary Swazis. In SACU 
boom years through 2008, sizeable shares of SACU funds went into a build-up of government 
employment and wage increases for civil servants, helping dampen disgruntlement among 
educated wage earners who otherwise might have actively protested the lack of democracy and 
economic development. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) repeatedly warned the Swazi government about over-
reliance on SACU support and recommended spending reductions and diversification of revenue 
sources.45 These warnings went unheeded. Then between 2008 and 2011 SACU receipts fell by 
almost 60 per cent resulting in severe liquidity shortages. At the time, the government wage bill 
was nearly 18 per cent of GDP, proportionately the highest in Africa. Swaziland’s budget deficit 
for 2010 – 11 reached almost 13 per cent of GDP, and access to domestic borrowing disappeared 
as lenders lost confidence.  
Threatened with bankruptcy, the Swazi civil administration tentatively agreed with the IMF on a 
Staff Monitored Program (SMP). The SMP agreement included requirements for the government 
to make financial management and political reforms and envisaged an intense fiscal adjustment 
amounting to a 5 percentage points of GDP reduction in the deficit in one year and relying 
mostly on wage cuts. The SMP assumed that the remaining deficit would be financed by 
domestic and foreign borrowing, including from the African Development Bank (AfDB). 
However, King Mswati refused to accept the stipulated reforms, the SMP faltered and the 
AfDB’s budget support plans for Swaziland were put on hold.46 
In the first quarter of 2011, as the Swazi government began defaulting on some payments, 
concern about the government’s ability to continue paying  its employees’ salaries sparked street 
demonstrations. Government authorities were nervous due to the then recent revolutions in North 
Africa, and they cracked down on protesters, using water cannons and raiding activists’ homes. 
Human Rights Watch reported that the Swazi government was on the brink of disaster brought 
on by extravagant spending by the royal family, fiscal indiscipline and corruption.  
King Mswati next sought a loan from the South African government which agreed to provide 2.4 
billion South African Rand (USD355 million) in SACU advances tied to reform conditions 
proposed by a broad coalition of Swazi civil society organizations. The actual terms of the 
conditions were not made public, but their acceptance by the Swazi government would have 
entailed financial management and political reforms, probably including constitutional changes 
to permit political parties to participate in elections. As earlier with the IMF’s SMP, Mswati 
rejected the reform conditions, and the loan amount was never paid out by the South African 
Treasury.47  
A financial disaster was averted in early 2012 when SACU suddenly transferred a windfall 
payment of R 700 million (USD 88 million) to the Swazi Treasury. SACU explained the reason 
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for the windfall as a combination of past underestimates of Swaziland’s 
share of regional customs receipts and a major upwards revision in 
estimates of future receipts. Introduction by the Swazi government of a 
14 per cent value added tax (VAT) in 2012 brought in additional 
revenue, but its knock on effects on basic living costs further worsened 
the precarious life conditions of the poor.  
The Swazi government’s precarious fiscal future 
Over the medium term, SACU revenues are projected to stabilize at 
about 15 per cent of GDP, a level notably below peaks of 20 per cent in 
2009-10 and 23 per cent in 2012-13. Given the low volume of imports 
into Swaziland in 2011, SACU revenues in 2013-14 are expected to 
decline again, re-emphasizing the need for the government to increase 
income from other sources and control spending.  However the 
government’s only significant effort to broaden its revenue base has 
been introduction of the VAT, and VAT proceeds are inadequate to 
offset future reductions in SACU funding.  
In their February, 2013 report on their then just concluded 
consultations with the Swaziland government, the IMF Executive 
Board ‘cautioned that Swaziland’s economic prospects remain difficult 
and that, without credible and comprehensive fiscal adjustment and 
structural reforms, the current fiscal and external position will be 
unsustainable over the medium term and subject to significant 
downside risks.’48 
As early as 2014, the Swazi government will most likely again face a 
fiscal deficit and an urgent need to reduce its wage bill. Any such 
action is likely to again spark protests to which the government will 
probably again respond with force, further damaging Swaziland’s 
reputation for stability. 
 
The consequences of unaccountable government for the Swazi 
majority 
The International Fund for Agricultural Development has reported a 
widening gap in Swaziland between urban and rural development. 84 
per cent of the country's poor live in rural and peri-urban areas, where 
per capita income is 4 times lower than in urban areas, and food 
consumption is 2 times lower. Traditional subsistence agriculture is 
failing due to worsening climatic conditions and farmers being too poor 
to purchase basic agricultural inputs and due also to a reduced farm 
labor force weakened by under-nutrition and decimated by disease. 66 
per cent of the population is unable to meet their basic food needs, and 
43 per cent live in chronic poverty. The current high levels of 
joblessness will continue to increase as ever larger numbers of the 
Civil society influences South 
Africa’s response to Mswati’s 
bailout request 
In the midst of the financial 
crisis, Swazi civil society seized 
the initiative to exert influence 
on behalf of democratic 
change.  As the South African 
government was considering 
King Mswati’s urgent appeal 
for a bailout, almost all Swazi 
civic groups met and quickly 
agreed they would lobby the 
South African government with 
one voice to make any loan to 
Swaziland conditional on 
political and financial 
management reforms.  The 
decision not to oppose the loan 
placed civil society on a high 
road. To have done otherwise 
would have positioned civil 
society as being in favor of 
government bankruptcy, a 
position they could not espouse 
given the consequences that 
bankruptcy would have caused 
Swazi people. The message 
civil society sent was fully 
relevant. Swaziland was in 
crisis due to incompetent 
leadership and bad financial 
management. Finally the 
decision by civil society to elect 
a single spokesman and entrust 
him to deliver their coordinated 
message ensured that civil 
society groups were not played 
off against each other.  
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burgeoning youth cohort reach working age and fail to find employment.49  
According to the UN Human Development Index, 29 per cent of Swazi children under the age of 
5 years are stunted. Swaziland has a similar rate of stunting to other countries with less than half 
of Swaziland’s per capita income. A survey in 2013 by the World Food Program and the Swazi 
Government found that Swaziland loses 3.1 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), or 
some USD 92 million annually, from the long-term impact of chronic childhood hunger. Some 
270,000 adults, or more than 40 per cent of the labor force, suffer from physical stunting as a 
result of chronic malnutrition in early childhood.50  
With a 26 per cent infection rate for persons between 15 and 49 years of age, Swaziland has the 
world’s highest rate of HIV infection. 40 per cent of Swazi women who present at pre-natal 
clinics are HIV positive. In 2011, UNICEF reported that there were approximately 200,000 
orphans and vulnerable children in Swaziland. According to Swazi government data, about 23 
percent of Swazi children are orphans, most as a result of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. At birth, 
Swazis have an 80% likelihood of dying before the age of 40 years. According to WHO data, 
Swazis have an average life expectancy of 48 years placing Swaziland near the bottom of WHO 
statistics for all countries. This compares to an average life expectancy of 61 years in Botswana, 
which has also been hit by one of the world’s worst HIV/AIDS epidemics but where accountable 
governance systems were better able to provide treatment and to promote disease prevention. 
Society in Swazi rural communities has suffered a major structural deformation under the 
simultaneous burdens of caring for inordinate numbers of people afflicted by terminal diseases, 
financing burial of the dead, coping with the absence of able bodied workers and attempting to 
assist large numbers of children struggling to survive without adult care givers. The absence of 
adult parents who traditionally taught  young people how to obtain life support from the land 
through  planting, tending and harvesting crops; caring for and using draught animals and 
building and repairing traditional houses and animal pens has precipitously deepened rural 
poverty and increased already large flows of indigent rural people into peri urban slums causing 
further disintegration of families, epidemic spread of diseases, alcoholism and other substance 
addictions and rising criminality. 
The desperate life conditions of the great majority of Swazis are similar to the fragile and 
threatened lives of victims of humanitarian emergencies stemming from natural disasters and 
armed conflict. However in Swaziland there is a permanent emergency due to the effects on the 
population of the greed of the royal family and exacerbated by ineptitude and malfeasance in the 
government.  
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UNCERTAIN LAW AND ROYAL PRIVILEGE  
 
Judicial dependence 
 
Swaziland’s constitution grants the monarch immunity from law and powers to appoint and 
remove judges. The king’s absolute authority over the judiciary renders the Swazi legal system 
hazardous for investors, attorneys and anyone who displeases the king. Twice during Mswati’s 
reign, attorneys have boycotted the courts for lengthy periods in protest of royal interference.   
The constitution stipulates that the chief justice should be a citizen of Swaziland51; however the 
king’s appointee, Michael Ramodibedi, is a Lesotho citizen. When questioned about this conflict 
with constitutional law, the secretary of the Judicial Service Commission said there was no 
Swazi whose qualifications merited the appointment. Of course, Swazi jurists with the requisite 
qualifications were available, but these probably would not be as pliable as a foreigner on fixed 
term contract. 
Ramodibedi previously was simultaneously employed as a judge in Lesotho, Botswana, the 
Seychelles, and Swaziland. When the Seychelles government learned of his many posts, his 
appointment there was revoked.52 Then, after he had become embroiled in controversies in 
Lesotho and Swaziland, his appointment in Botswana was not renewed. Ramodibedi has refused 
a request from the Lesotho prime minister to resign, and the prime minister has called for an 
investigation of Ramodibedi’s conduct in office.53   
Ramodibedi has been very serviceable to King Mswati. When the king confiscated a Swazi 
businessman’s hotel, the owner attempted to sue for compensation. Ramodibedi blocked the suit 
with an instruction to attorneys that no case against the king can be brought before any court. 
The Law Society called the instruction unnecessary pointing out that the constitution already 
granted the king immunity. Nevertheless, the point was clear. The chief justice’s loyalty lay with 
the king and not with the constitution or with ordinary people who might seek justice from the 
courts. 
In 2010, Judge Thomas Masuku, an internationally respected member of the Swaziland High 
Court bench, found in favor of Swazi villagers who sued to retrieve cattle which police had 
seized and placed in the king’s herd. In his judgment, Masuku recalled that the king recently had 
appealed to Swazis to obey the law. He wrote ‘It would be hard to imagine that his majesty could 
conceivably speak with a forked tongue, saying one thing and authorizing his officers to do the 
opposite.’ Based on this sentence, Ramodibedi, acting as prosecutor and judge, found Masuku 
guilty of insulting the king,54 who then ordered the justice minister to dismiss Masuku. When the 
minister hesitated, the king fired the minister and replaced him with a compliant prince who 
signed the dismissal notice. Needless to say, no judge who values his job would now risk a 
conflict with the chief justice. 
In 2008 Mswati’s unilateral decision to appoint Barnabus Dlamini to the post of prime minister 
was also a violation of Swaziland’s constitution. Dlamini, who is known for corrupt land deals, 
was not qualified because he was not a member of parliament. Chapter VI, paragraph 67, (1) of 
the constitution states “The King shall appoint the Prime Minister from members of the House 
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acting on a recommendation of the King’s Advisory Council.” Several Swazis with access to the 
palace inner circle have characterized the appointment of Dlamini as having further strengthened 
Mswati’s absolute hold on power.55 Dlamini is known to readily carry out Mswati’s instructions 
without question.  
It is widely believed in Swaziland that Prime Minister Dlamini collaborates with the king in 
various illicit schemes designed to increase both the king’s and the prime minister’s personal 
wealth. In 2012, dealings by the prime minister and the king to exclude a lower cost mobile 
phone service from Swaziland in favor of MTN, in which both Mswati and Dlamini are 
shareholders, caused a public outcry that culminated in an unprecedented vote in the lower house 
of parliament of no confidence in the prime minister. In terms of the constitution, the king was 
legally bound to remove the prime minister. However both the prime minister and the king made 
a show of ignoring the no confidence vote and after a 12 day stand-off, parliament meekly 
rescinded the vote.56 A fuller account of the MTN saga is at Annex 5.  
Given the condition of rule of law in Swaziland, it is not remarkable that Swaziland is country 
number 123 out of 185 on the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ rankings. It is telling that 
two constituent scores were even lower: 128 from 185 for protecting investors and 174 out of 
185 for enforcing contracts.57  
Traditional governance in disarray  
 
At least 80 per cent of Swazi people live in the 55 tinkhundla, each consisting of between 5 and 
10 chiefdoms. The approximately 350 chiefs hold hereditary office with the king having 
responsibility for choosing the heir who succeeds to a vacant office. In Swaziland’s polygamous 
traditional culture, often there are many heirs, and contests among heirs for appointment by the 
king have seriously disrupted many local communities.58  
 
The chiefs, as local representatives of the king, exercise administrative and judicial authorities in 
accordance with unwritten customary law. They are charged with allocating land to families, 
looking after the welfare of the people in their chiefdoms and maintaining law and order. Thus 
the economic and social well-being of an individual family is heavily dependent on the family’s 
standing with the local chief. This aspect of Swazi rural life is a major factor in rural people’s 
subservience to chiefs, and through them, to the king. The World Bank has criticized the power 
of chiefs stating that the poor systems of accountability and land management are among the 
most critical constraints to growth and poverty reduction in rural areas.59 
 
The customary legal system presided over by the traditional chiefs is empowered by the 
constitution to function parallel to the judiciary headed by the chief justice. However the 
constitution states only that “the powers and functions of the chiefs are in accordance with Swazi 
law and custom” and offers no clarity concerning the content of Swazi laws and customs. 
(Chapter XIV, paragraph 233)  This lack of clarity provides ample cover for individual chiefs to 
interpret laws and customs subjectively and arbitrarily.60 
 
In further defining the position of the traditional chiefs within the dual legal system, the 
constitution states (chapter XIV, paragraph 233) that “chiefs are the footstool of iNgwenyama 
and iNgwenyama rules through the chiefs.” (iNgwenyama is the siSwati language equivalent of 
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the title “king”.) Presently the footstool is wobbly and the Council of Swaziland Churches 
reports that nearly half of all Swazi chiefdoms are in dispute over who should be the rightful 
incumbents.  
Denial of basic rights  
 
In every year since 1993, Freedom House in its annual Freedom in the World report has rated 
Swaziland as “Not Free.”61 In 2012, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 
issued a sharp criticism of Swaziland's human-rights record, calling on the Swazi government to 
honor its commitments under international law with regard to freedom of expression, association 
and assembly.  
The 2012 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report for Swaziland cited a list of serious 
abuses perpetrated by police, soldiers and other government agents. These included killings by 
security forces; use of torture, beatings and excessive force on detainees; arbitrary arrests and 
lengthy pre-trial detention; arbitrary interference with privacy and home; restrictions on 
freedoms of speech and press and harassment of journalists; restrictions on freedoms of 
assembly, association and movement; prohibitions on political activity and harassment of 
political activists; harassment of labor leaders and restrictions on worker rights.62 
The king’s increasing reliance on security forces to maintain control  
 
King Mswati is both commander in chief of the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force and 
Swaziland’s minister of defense. Throughout 2011 and 2012, as the king was under pressure 
from Swazi activists to implement economic and political reforms, the army and police were 
employed against street demonstrations and to break up both public and private meetings. This 
included beating protesters and taking numerous activists into custody. One university student 
leader arrested at the time continues to be in detention in September 2013.  
Reacting to the protests, the king substantially increased the security sector establishment and 
stocks of arms, munitions and equipment. African Defense Magazine reported that Swazi 
government spending on defense equipment in the budget year 2013 – 14 represents a more than 
50 fold increase over the previous year. The figures are E 63.19 million (USD 6.8 million) for 
this year compared to E 1.25 million (USD 134.4 thousand) last year. The budget allocation of E 
1.9 billion (USD 206.5 million) for the 3 security forces – army, police and correctional services 
- amounts to slightly more than 15 per cent of the total government budget of E 12.6 billion 
(USD 1.37 billion).63 By comparison, the governments of Botswana and Lesotho allocated in 
their 2013 – 14 budgets around 9 per cent for security forces including military and police.  
Swazi activists criticized the extraordinary security sector increases and said the increases are 
preparations for strong arm responses to public protests during the next government financial 
crisis. However a Swazi government spokesman said the increases are needed to fight cattle 
rustling on the Mozambican border, a hardly plausible excuse. 
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THE SWAZI DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT 
 
The operating environment: violations of freedom of association, assembly and expression 
 
The status of political parties in Swaziland is confused by inconsistencies in laws and 
government pronouncements and by the government’s distortion of language intended to delude 
outsiders into believing Swaziland is a democratic country. Political parties were banned by King 
Sobhuza’s 1973 Proclamation, and this proclamation has not been repealed. However a more 
recent pronouncement by the Attorney General termed political parties as legal but prohibited 
from participating in elections. The Swazi constitution allows Swazis to participate in elections 
only as individuals.  
As an absolute monarchy, the authority to govern is accorded to a king through inheritance and 
then distributed by the king to royal family members and others whom the king trusts to do his 
bidding. To challenge government authority constitutes an offence against the all-powerful king. 
Under such circumstances, pro-democracy civil society organizations, including trade unions and 
most political parties, must attempt to function in an environment where their rights and standing 
are never clearly defined. Organizations and individual activists are constantly under threat from 
the modern and traditional government structures, both of which are under the king’s absolute 
authority. The king’s agents can at will search premises, ban meetings, detain persons and use 
legal and extra-legal processes to remove activists from society. The authorities also employ 
censorship, interference with communications, confiscation and destruction of property, 
beatings, attacks with weapons and torture.64   
The situation of pro-democracy activists became greatly more difficult in August 2008 when the 
king signed into law the Suppression of Terrorism Act. The act does not clearly define the 
meaning of ‘terrorist act’ and therefore poses a constant threat to a broad spectrum of normal 
civil society activities. Amnesty International and the International Bar Association’s Human 
Rights Institute found that ‘the offences prohibited by the law are defined with such over-breadth 
and imprecision that they place excessive restrictions on a wide range of human rights, such as 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of 
association, and freedom of assembly, without adhering to the requirements of demonstrable 
proportionality and necessity.’ The act reverses the onus of proof with respect to allegations of 
membership in a terrorist group. Thus an accused person must prove he or she is not a member 
of a terrorist organization rather than the more usual condition whereby the prosecution would be 
required to provide conclusive evidence of membership. The law also places prior restraints on 
courts in reviewing government orders that proscribe organizations.65 
In September 2008 at a traditional gathering, King Mswati publicly endorsed suffocating 
dissidents and denying them all possibilities of earning a living. The king’s call was especially 
significant for rural dwellers because the king, through local chiefs, controls the allocation of 
family home sites and agricultural land, the distribution of food relief and the award of 
scholarships without which large numbers of Swazi children and youths cannot attend primary 
and high schools and university. The king allows chiefs, all of whom owe their jobs to the king, 
to make up their own by-laws and to use the full might of the state to ensure compliance. Swazis 
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who speak out against royal and chiefly authority risk losing their homes and farm plots. These 
ever present threats cause most rural Swazis to be very cautious in what they do and say.66 
 
Late at night on 21 September 2008, 2 days after parliamentary elections, a bomb detonated near 
a bridge on the Mbabane – Manzini highway about 1 km from King Mswati’s principal palace at  
Lozitha. Of the 4 men involved, 2 were killed by the bomb, one escaped and fled Swaziland, and 
the other, a South African, was apprehended, tried and is still imprisoned.67  
 
The bomb blast heightened tensions between the king and political activists, whom the king said 
would be eliminated. On 14 November 2008, the Peoples United Democratic Movement 
(PUDEMO), PUDEMO’s youth wing, the Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO), the 
Swaziland Solidarity Network (SSN) and other groups were proscribed as terrorist organizations. 
Mario Masuku, the PUDEMO president, was arrested and charged with terrorism, as were 15 
others, including the president of SWAYOCO. After a year in pre-trial detention, Masuku was 
acquitted of all charges by the Swazi High Court. Angered by this decision, the king moved 
decisively to gain greater control over the judiciary by appointing a pliable chief justice and 
eliminating independent minded judges from the bench. In 2013, PUDEMO, SWAYOCO and 
SSN continue to be proscribed, but PUDEMO leaders, including Masuku, go about their party 
business openly inside Swaziland. However the government prohibits large PUDEMO 
meetings.68    
Swazi civil society includes organizations that provide food and medical services to the poor and 
others that advocate for democracy and defend human rights. The former group usually avoids 
the latter due to their concerns about losing permission from the government to do their work. As 
a result, the organizations which help the victims of bad government feel they must avoid 
addressing the central cause of the problems of the people whom they assist. Some religious 
denominations sympathize with human rights advocates, but the vast majority of churches avoid 
association with organizations that promote democracy.69   
On 31 August 2013, King Mswati announced that a lightning bolt from a cloudless sky had 
brought him a command from God to introduce ‘monarchial democracy’ as a replacement for the 
present electoral system. Under this ‘new form’ political parties continue to be banned from 
taking part in elections and Swazi people continue to be authorized to vote only for a small 
number of the power structure’s hand-picked candidates for the House of Assembly. The king 
will still choose the prime minister and other government officials, and all branches of the 
government will still be subservient to the king. In reality, only the name of the system changed. 
One result of the uncertain legality of political parties is an absence of legislation in Swaziland 
governing aspects of political party life such as registration, regulation, funding and financial 
control.70 
Summary descriptions of civil society organizations 
  
Political parties 
As many as 10 political parties hope someday to be permitted by the government to present 
candidates for elections. Most of the 10 have few members beyond their own party officials, but 
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4 parties – PUDEMO, NNLC, the Sive Siyinqaba National Movement (also known as Sibahle 
Sinje) and the Swaziland Democratic Party (SWADEPA) – probably have followings of at least 
several thousand.  
The NNLC, Swaziland’s oldest still functioning party, draws its core membership from urban, 
educated Swazis. Its philosophical underpinnings are in Pan Africanism. NNLC’s win in 1972 of 
3 parliamentary seats prompted King Sobhuza’s 1973 prohibition of political parties. NNLC 
demands the elimination of cultural practices of oppression and exploitation of the masses. 
NNLC and PUDEMO, which often are rivals for support from the same base, joined together to 
boycott the 2008 elections. NNLC is boycotting the 2013 elections.71  
 
Although PUDEMO has been proscribed since 2008, it probably has the largest and broadest 
base of all Swazi parties. As the only active political party in Swaziland from 1983 to 1996, 
PUDEMO laid claim to the role of the sole legitimate voice of the Swazi opposition. This claim 
now has become an obstacle to broad cooperation among Swaziland’s pro-democracy 
organizations. The People’s Manifesto, which PUDEMO adopted in 1996, demanded the 
creation of a constitutional, multi-party democracy with an elected and accountable government. 
PUDEMO has longstanding relationships with the South African government alliance partners – 
the African National Congress (ANC), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
and the South African Communist Party (SACP). PUDEMO is boycotting the 2013 elections.72 
 
The Sive Siyinqaba National Movement (Sibahle Sinje) was formed to push back against 
PUDEMO and shield Swazi culture from western influence. ‘Sive Siyinqaba’ means ‘nation 
united’ – by implication, around the monarch - and ‘Sibahle Sinje’ translates as ‘we are beautiful 
as we are with our culture and traditions’. The party’s aspiration to be seen as the monarchy’s 
defender was complicated in its early years due to the king’s opposition to the existence of 
political parties generally. By 2013 however, relations between Sive Siyinqaba and Mswati have 
improved. Prince Guduza, Mswati’s half-brother, who was speaker of the House of Assembly in 
the most recent parliament, is part of Sive Siyinqaba’s senior leadership. With the active 
encouragement of the Sive Siyinqaba leadership, members of the party are running as individuals 
in the 2013 elections.73  
 
SWADEPA, Swaziland’s youngest party, was launched in 2011 by 2 well known agriculture 
workers union officials. SWADEPA’s game plan is to win seats in the 2013 elections and then to 
break down barriers to multi-party democracy from inside the House of Assembly.74 
 
Non-governmental organizations 
 
Around 70 organizations are affiliated with Swaziland’s Coordinating Assembly of Non-
Governmental Organizations (CANGO). Most of these organizations’ work relates to 
humanitarian aid, and only a little more than 10 per cent of CANGO member organizations focus 
on democratic governance and human rights. Most notable among these are the Swaziland 
Coalition of Concerned Civic Organizations (SCCCO), the Swaziland United Democratic Front 
(SUDF) and the Swaziland affiliate of the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa 
(OSISA).75  
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SCCCO, which includes as its members professional and business organizations, labor 
federations, religious denominations, a media NGO and women’s groups, is the broadest civic 
organization in Swaziland. By conducting civic education directed toward grassroots 
communities, SCCCO seeks to promote acceptance of basic democratic values and respect for 
human rights. 
 
SUDF was formed in 2008 as a coalition of pro-democracy groups including political parties, 
unions and churches. The founding of SUDF sought to strengthen civil society unity and 
coordination among civil society groups. Increasingly SUDF has come to be viewed by those 
who do not support PUDEMO as a PUDEMO affiliate, and this perception has created tensions 
in civil society some of which have developed into disruptive fissures. 
 
OSISA’s vision is to promote the ideals, values, institutions and practices of open society with 
the aim of helping to establish vibrant and tolerant democracies in Southern Africa. OSISA 
supports advocacy on Swaziland issues and assists other organizations’ project initiatives 
through grant making.  
 
Religious denominations 
 
Swazi Christians, who make up around 90 per cent of the population, are divided into 3 groups: 
about one quarter are congregants of old establishment churches such the Roman Catholics, 
Anglicans, Lutherans, Methodists, etc. which for the most part support democratic change; 
another quarter are Evangelicals whose interpretation of scripture prohibits involvement with 
politics; and one half are members of indigenous churches who overwhelmingly support the 
status quo. The general secretary of the Council of Swaziland Churches, which is mostly made 
up of the first group, said growing political awareness in the youth cohort presents a possibility 
that eventually the indigenous churches will find it necessary to adjust their pro monarchy 
position.76 
 
Trade unions 
Unlike other pro-democracy groups, trade unions have had a legal basis from which to operate 
provided by various Industrial Relations Acts which have been in effect since before 
independence and which define rules for the collective negotiation of terms and conditions of 
employment and dispute resolution mechanisms.  Reported figures of total trade union 
membership in all sectors exceed 100,000. 
Swazi trade unions enjoy stronger international linkages than any other parts of civil society 
through their affiliation with the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). These 
linkages are powered and protected by International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions and 
the ILO’s complaint system, through which Swazi trade unions have been able to bring 
international attention to abuses committed by the Swazi government. Over the past several 
years, Swaziland has been one of a small number of countries cited by the ILO for denial of 
rights guaranteed under ILO conventions. The ILO has repeatedly sent missions to Swaziland 
that have reported back on the government’s non-compliance with an ILO convention as well as 
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crimes by government agents against union activists including intimidation, kidnapping, 
unlawful entry into and search of homes, torture and death while in detention.   
The Trade Union Congress of Swaziland (TUCOSWA) was founded in March 2012 bringing 
together the 2 labor federations and the Swaziland National Association of Teachers (SNAT), 
Swaziland’s largest union with 9,000 members. The association of SNAT with TUCOSWA was 
significant due to SNAT’s organizational strengths and history of success in bringing out its 
members for strikes and public demonstrations.77   
At TUCOSWA’s founding congress, a resolution was taken that ‘the current system of 
Government in Swaziland is one that is undemocratic, repressive and dictatorial and that the 
Federation shall cause for a total boycott of the national elections in 2013 unless the elections are 
held under a multiparty system.’ This was an openly political pronouncement. Many in civil 
society, including the SNAT president, objected to what they viewed as undue influence from 
one political party in the TUCOSWA leadership. They also objected to a decision by the 
TUCOSWA president to associate TUCOSWA with the Swaziland United Democratic Front 
(SUDF), which they perceive as a PUDEMO affiliate. The SNAT president, who says she 
adheres to the principle that labor unions should be independent of political parties, withdrew 
SNAT and its financial support from TUCOSWA.78   
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IMPENDING CRITICAL JUNCTURES FOR CIVIL SOCIETY  
 
The following is a list of probable future critical junctures for which Swazi civil society should 
prepare to exert influence. 
2013 elections and the formation of a new government 
Political party participation is not permitted, and the elections will be held under conditions 
which will ensure an undemocratic outcome. Civil society should facilitate a flow of factual 
information about the registration of voters, nomination of candidates, voting and appointment of 
a government by the king.  The information should be addressed to the regional and international 
media, the SADC Secretariat, the African Union and the ACHPR, the IMF, the UN Human 
Rights Commissioner, Southern African governments and governments with diplomatic 
accreditation in Swaziland, including those based in Maputo and Pretoria. The electoral process 
in 2013 will not be made any more democratic as a consequence of these actions. However, 
elections do attract international attention and provide an opportunity once every five years for 
civil society to reach audiences that normally take no notice of abuses in Swaziland. Rather than 
an opportunity to change the king’s behavior, civil society should view the elections as a chance 
to gain allies and win support for their cause.  
Following these elections, King Mswati will be required to form a new government. Although it 
seems likely that Prime Minister Dlamini will return to office, five sitting ministers were not 
nominated during primary elections in August 2013, and four more have overstayed the 
maximum ten years in office. It is therefore likely that the makeup of the new cabinet will be 
quite different from the current one, presenting an additional opportunity for civil society to 
engage with new ministers who may be more open to discussing their demands. 
Commonwealth 
A Commonwealth observer mission will be present in Swaziland for the 2013 elections as was 
the case in 2008. Civil society should maintain close liaison with the observer mission. Given 
that the king has ignored the recommendations from the 2008 mission, civil society should 
explore with the observer mission openings for the Commonwealth to increase pressure on the 
Swazi government. The possibility of expulsion from the Commonwealth should be addressed. 
Swaziland’s expulsion from the Commonwealth would be a serious blow to the image of the 
royal family, who enjoy receiving invitations to major British royal events. 
International Labor Organization 
At the ILO annual conference in June 2013, it was decided that the ILO will send yet another 
high level investigative mission to Swaziland. The principal purposes of the mission will be to 
look into TUCOSWA's deregistration and to put pressure on the Swazi government to abide by 
ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association. This will be an important opportunity for trade 
unions and other civil society organizations to involve foreign embassies, the media in South 
Africa and international human rights groups in following the progress and outcome of the ILO 
mission and incorporating the conclusions of the ILO in their Swaziland data bases. 
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Security sector build up 
The Swazi government’s security sector budget for 2012 – 2013 includes provision for an 
increase from ZAR 1.3 m (USD 162.5 thousand) to ZAR 63.2 m (USD 7 million) for durable 
equipment and materials – probably lots of arms and military machines – and an increase from 
ZAR 52.7 m (USD 6.6 million) to ZAR 96.3 m (USD 10.7 million) for correctional services. 
Civil society should investigate and publicize the intentions of the Swazi authorities for using 
these large increases. Civil society should also attempt to trace the origins of new military 
equipment coming into Swaziland and should consider launching an advocacy campaign 
highlighting that the  arms are likely to be used for repression of fundamental freedoms. A 
central argument of this campaign should be that there is no armed resistance in Swaziland and 
so there can only be one purpose behind the government’s bolstering its security sector: to 
intimidate and attack Swazi citizens who have legitimate grievances. 
Youth unemployment 
Around 530,000 Swazis are under 15 years old. Unemployment for the 16 to 24 age group is 
over 50 per cent. Very large numbers of youth have lost parents to disease epidemics and many 
of the older youth must care for younger siblings. As the under 15’s enter the job market, there 
will be few jobs available. These circumstances are already an emergency for Swaziland, and 
civil society must seek assistance for youth and engage youth to channel their energies in support 
of peaceful and constructive change. By encouraging small-scale and relevant activities at the 
local level, civil society can involve young people in activities that hold meaning for them. In 
Africa, disillusioned youth are particularly at risk of becoming the foot soldiers for armed 
rebellions. It is vital that civil society organizations work to prevent that eventuality by engaging 
the youth in peaceful and constructive civic activism. 
2014 – 2016 reduction in SACU transfers 
It is widely anticipated that South African Customs Union transfers to Swaziland will decrease 
again in the period 2014 – 2016 and that this will cause another financial crisis for which the 
Swazi government will not be prepared. A full discussion of the role of civil society in such 
circumstances is included in the Recommendations section at the end of this paper. This includes 
recommendations for preparing for and dealing with a possible SADC intervention. 
African Commission intervention 
In 2012, 3 Swazi lawyers travelled to the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights in 
Banjul, The Gambia where they presented compelling information on the troubling human rights 
abuses which have occurred and continue to occur in Swaziland. As a result of the Swazi 
lawyers’ intervention, the Commission issued a strong condemnation in the form of an official 
ACHPR resolution on Swaziland. The full text of the resolution is Annex 4. Should the Swazi 
government fail to respond appropriately to this resolution, Swazi human rights activists have 
made preparations to file a formal case against the government which could potentially result in 
a judgment against Swaziland and even an official Promotional Visit by the ACHPR to 
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Swaziland. Such a visit would be an important opportunity for Swazi civil society to push for the 
government to make concessions on fundamental freedoms and human rights issues. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Swaziland’s gross national per capita income is USD 3,362. Nevertheless most Swazi people 
must go about their lives in desperate circumstances. Food security is a constant concern, and 
Swaziland has scored some of the worst rankings on world statistical tables in terms of HIV 
infection rates, average life expectancy, numbers of orphaned children, children whose growth is 
stunted and other indicators of the effects of grossly uneven income distribution. These problems 
each have multiple causes, but the king’s overwhelming and unchecked corruption of 
government power underlies every one of them.  
 
The economy of Swaziland is stagnant and structured to protect the king’s personal business 
interests. Also, Swaziland’s productivity has been compromised by the loss of a sizeable part of 
the workforce to disease and early death. Two years ago, King Mswati’s government 
experienced a serious liquidity crisis, and the chance of an actual financial collapse in the short 
to medium term is still significant. King Mswati’s ideas about how to fix the problems are naïve. 
In many cases they constitute fronts for corrupt schemes to increase his own personal wealth.  
 
Swazi tourism authorities have succeeded in selling Swaziland as a fairy tale tourist destination 
with an exotic culture where thousands of bare breasted girls gleefully dance for the king. 
However, knowledge among foreigners of Swazi people’s problems is growing, and pressures on 
the king have mounted over the past 3 years. His concern about negative reporting on Swaziland 
in international media is probably the reason for his reported obsession with news channels. High 
powered people and organizations, some capable of offering substantial assistance to Swaziland, 
have tried to convince the king that his unwillingness to recognize and act on the need for reform 
is untenable. Still, as is evidenced in his recent announcement of a vision from God, Mswati 
apparently believes he can continue to game both his critics and his supporters.  
Throughout 27 years on the throne, Mswati’s personal development has made him more rigid 
and more criminal. As he demonstrated during the financial crisis in 2011 – 12, he confuses 
brinksmanship for governance. His response to crisis has been to recruit more security forces and 
buy more weapons. Some members of the extended royal family are said to be embarrassed by 
Swaziland’s status as a pariah in the eyes of the world, but they apparently are too satiated in 
their berths on the gravy train to do anything but complain in private. One of them has 
commented, almost nonchalantly, ‘They’re sitting on a bomb, but they’re too stupid to know it.’ 
Another has said: ‘We feel Mswati will be the last king.’ 
In 2011, Swaziland’s failure to uphold its responsibilities under the IMF’s Staff Monitored 
Program showed that democratic change is anathema to Mswati. For him, his family and his 
cronies, the purpose of the government of Swaziland is to ensure their security and their hold on 
all necessary means to sustain their enjoyment of wealth and luxury. Perhaps due to a lack of 
education and sophistication, or perhaps because of Mswati’s deep conviction that occult powers 
of curses, charms and potions are protecting him, there is no indication yet that he might 
recognize the seeds of his own self-destruction in his mismanagement of government and in his 
greed and selfishness.  
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This does not mean that there is no hope for change in Swaziland. Just across Swaziland’s 
borders, South Africans and Mozambicans not so long ago faced brutal dictatorships and 
managed to bring democratic change to their countries. Civil society can plant and nurture seeds 
to grow a more open, equal and prosperous society. But Swazi civil society is beset with 
challenges from within. As it has struggled under the yoke of an oppressive regime, it has also 
found itself fighting within its own ranks. If in the future Swazi civil society is to have a decisive 
role in liberating Swazi people from oppression and poverty, civil society activists of different 
persuasions must learn the discipline necessary to: 
1. stop imputing false motives against each other,   
2. agree on an agenda for change and 
3. take the initiative for leading Swazis toward achievement of democratic goals.  
 
FREEDOM HOUSE RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
For Swazi civil society 
 
• Swazi civil society should set the agenda for democratic change in Swaziland. Swazi 
democrats must prepare for a long, hard struggle by building support for their mission 
among international organizations, foreign governments and organizations, media, 
businesses, professional and advocacy organizations and people of global note. Given the 
expected repeat of a government financial crisis, civil society should prepare to gain the 
full range of political and public relations advantages which the next financial crisis will 
offer. 
• Civil society organizations with different political, religious or philosophical groundings 
should adopt an attitude of respectfully disagreeing while being able to form tactical 
alliances when these can help them move forward toward democratic goals.  
 
• Civil society should begin now to lead the Swazi people in defining the reforms they 
want and the process that they favor in order to achieve them. Civil society should also 
make the message of democracy and human rights relevant to all Swazis by substantially 
expanding efforts to connect with Swazis in all regions and economic groups. 
• Swazi civil society should get ready for pro-active engagement with the king. 
Engagement might not happen soon, but when it does, civil society must be ready to seize 
the initiative. Civil society should resist any attempt to impose a change process from 
above either by the king or SADC and the AU. If Swaziland becomes the subject of an 
imposed reform process, civil society should demand parity of representation with the 
Swazi government, should only join after receiving a mandate from the Swazi people and 
should enter the process with well elaborated proposals for genuine reforms. 
• Of critical importance, Swazi civil society should insist on neutralization of all 
government security forces prior to agreeing to enter into negotiations. 
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• The sizeable investments in Swaziland of Coca Cola, Cadbury Chocolates and the 
Rhodes Food Group benefit from royal protection and provide the king with income. 
Civil society should examine these companies with a view toward either recruiting the 
companies as supporters for democracy and human rights or exploiting the companies’ 
royal connections for advocacy purposes and for channeling pressure for reform through 
the companies to the king. 
• International attention focused on Swaziland around the September 2013 elections offers 
civil society opportunities to address multiple audiences. Given the non-compliance of 
Swazi elections with Commonwealth standards, civil society should request a 
Commonwealth review of Swaziland’s eligibility for continued membership. Civil 
society should work through African networks to preclude SADC and the AU from 
endorsing Swaziland’s sham elections. And civil society should deluge the international 
media with election related data and images. 
• King Mswati habitually watches CNN, Sky News, BBC and Al Jazeera. Civil society 
should continuously provide information about Swaziland to these organizations to make 
sure the king sees that people everywhere know the problems his rule has caused for the 
Swazi people.  
For the king 
• King Mswati should begin to create relationships of trust with the Swazi people by 
revoking oppressive laws, stopping the looting of public coffers, releasing political 
prisoners, allowing political exiles to safely return, respecting Swazis’ human rights and 
allowing pro-democracy groups, political parties and trade unions – including 
TUCOSWA - to organize and communicate freely with all Swazis.   
• The king should set his own financial interests aside in promoting the development and 
expansion of the Swazi economy in order to build a foundation for the well-being of 
Swazis.  
• The king should ensure that Swazi working people and businesses will continue to 
benefit after 2014 under the African Growth and Opportunity Act by instituting requisite 
human rights and governance reforms.  
• The king should agree without pre-conditions to participate as an equal party with the 
Swazi people in negotiations to bring about accountable governance, the rule of law, 
respect for people’s rights and allocation of national resources in the interest of the entire 
nation.   
For SADC and the international community 
 
• Foreign governments, most notably the governments of Swaziland’s closest neighbors, 
and regional and international organizations should provide all possible support  for the 
implementation of the foregoing recommendations. 
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ACRONYMS 
ACHPR  African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
AfDB   African Development Bank 
ANC   African National Congress 
AU   African Union 
BBC   British Broadcasting Corporation 
CANGO  Coordinating Assembly of Non-Governmental Organizations 
CNN   Central News Network 
COSATU  Congress of South African Trade Unions 
EISA   Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa 
FSEJ   Foundation for Socic-Economic Justice 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
HIV   Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
ICCPR   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ILO   International Labor Organization 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
INM   Imbokodvo National Movement 
ITUC   International Trade Union Confederation 
MTN   Mobile Telephone Network 
NNLC   Ngwane National Liberatory Congress 
OSISA   Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa 
PUDEMO  People’s United Democratic Movement 
SACP   South African Communist Party 
SACU   Southern African Customs Union 
SADC   Southern African Development Community 
SCCCO  Swaziland Coalition of Concerned Civic Organizations 
SMP   IMF Staff Monitored Program 
SNAT   Swaziland National Association of Teachers 
SPTC   Swaziland Posts and Telecommunications Corporation 
SSN   Swaziland Solidarity Network 
SUDF   Swaziland United Democratic Front 
SWADEPA  Swaziland Democratic Party 
SWAYOCO  Swaziland Youth Congress 
TUCOSWA  Trade Union Congress of Swaziland 
UDHR   Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UK   United Kingdom 
VAT   Value Added Tax 
WHO   World Health Organization 
ZAR   South African Rand 
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ANNEXES 
 
Annex 1.  Detailed description of political parties, trade unions and civil society 
organizations operating in Swaziland. 
 
Political parties  
The status of political parties in Swaziland is confused by inconsistencies in various laws and 
pronouncements and by the government’s distortion of language intended to delude outsiders – 
and perhaps themselves - into believing Swaziland is a democratic country. Political parties were 
banned through Proclamation No. 7 of 12 April 1973 issued by King Sobhuza II. (See Annex 
III.) This proclamation has not been repealed. The Swazi constitution permits Swazis to 
participate as individuals in nomination processes and elections, and this provision is interpreted 
by government authorities as a prohibition of participation by political parties. 
On 14 August 2007, King Mswati declared that political parties remained banned.  In April 2008, 
the Chairman of the Elections and Boundaries Commission, Chief Gija Dlamini, reiterated that 
political parties were unlawful and would not be permitted to take part in the 2008 House of 
Assembly elections.  However in July 2008, in arguments put to the High Court, Attorney 
General Majahenkhaba Dlamini said that political parties were legal, but not permitted by law to 
participate in elections. In the lead up to the 2013 elections, Chief Gija has stated in very telling 
language that ‘The owners of the country have clearly stated that people will stand for elections 
in their individual capacities and not through political parties.’  
Late at night on the fourth day following the 2008 elections, 4 men detonated a car bomb near a 
bridge located in the vicinity of the Lozitha Palace, the Swazi king’s principal residence.  The 
incident caused tension between the government and political activists, who refused to condemn 
the bombing outright. Subsequently King Mswati said that political activists, whom he called 
terrorists, would be eliminated. The Suppression of Terrorism Act which had been signed into 
law by Mswati on 7 August 2008 was used on 14 November 2008 to outlaw a number of groups 
as ‘terrorist organizations’. The banned organizations included the Peoples United Democratic 
Movement (PUDEMO), PUDEMO’s youth wing, the Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO), 
and the South African-based Swaziland Solidarity Network. Mario Masuku, the PUDEMO 
president, was arrested and charged with terrorism, as were 15 others, including the president of 
SWAYOCO. Masuku refused bail to force the government to move to trial, and he was detained 
on remand for over a year. At the trial, the evidence presented against him by the state was so 
weak that the judge found that there was no case to answer. In 2013, PUDEMO continues to be 
proscribed under the Suppression of Terrorism Act. Presently the PUDEMO leadership, 
including Masuku, go about their party business openly in Swaziland. At times they are harassed 
by the authorities, and at other times they appear to be tolerated.   
One result of the uncertain legality of political parties is an absence of legislation in Swaziland 
governing aspects of political party life such as registration, regulation, funding, and financial 
control. 
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Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC)  
The NNLC was formed in the 1960s by western educated Swazis whose political ideas were 
influenced by Pan Africanism. The NNLC served as the main opposition party to King Sobhuza 
II’s Imbokodvo National Movement. After the NNLC won 3 seats in parliamentary elections in 
1972, Sobhuza outlawed political parties and severely persecuted NNLC party leaders some of 
whom, including the NNLC’s president Dr. Ambrose Zwane, went into exile in Tanzania. Some 
other NNLC leaders were co-opted and moved into high positions in Swazi government. 
Eventually the exiled leadership returned to Swaziland, and in 1997 the party reorganized itself. 
Dr. Zwane’s funeral in 1998 turned into a political rally leading to a revival of the NNLC and the 
adoption of a new constitution.  
As an African nationalist party, the NNLC seeks support from the same constituency as 
PUDEMO. Under the leadership of Obed Dlamini, a former prime minister who was elected 
NNLC president in 1998, the NNLC adopted a more conservative position than PUDEMO.  
NNLC and PUDEMO formed a united front together with civic organizations and student groups 
to promote a boycott of the 2008 elections. The two parties have had ties with the same trade 
unions, business associations and civil society bodies. The NNLC shares similar objectives with 
PUDEMO, but couches its pronouncements in more moderate language.  
The NNLC’s stated objectives include:  
Liberation of the citizens of Swaziland from a mentality that accepts the status quo, docility, and 
abuse of the people in the name of culture and traditions; 
Eradication of all forms of discrimination on the basis of ancestry, race, language, creed, sex, 
social standing, physical impairment, etc. and the creation a democratic society in which all have 
equal opportunities of self-advancement and realization;  
Restoration of a multiparty democratic political dispensation with a constitution which protects 
the freedoms of all Swazis, i.e. freedoms of association, assembly, expression etc. as defined in 
the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights; and 
Promotion of national unity and consciousness in the whole nation by bringing about harmony 
between the people and the traditional leaders including elimination of cultural practices which 
serve to oppress and exploit the masses. 
The NNLC includes separate wings for women and youth. The party has a substantial 
membership within the Swaziland National Association of Teachers (SNAT), and the current 
SNAT president, Sibongile Mazibuko, is a former NNLC national treasurer.  
Although the NNLC formally boycotted the 2003 and 2008 elections, its president Obed Dlamini 
participated. Under the current NNLC president, Dr. Alvit Dlamini, a medical practitioner, the 
NNLC has announced that it will boycott the 2013 elections.  
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People’s United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) 
PUDEMO was founded in 1983 by university students, and the party has continued to attract 
support from Swazi youth. Over the years, it has been most active in schools, the University of 
Swaziland and the industrial sector.  Despite its proscription as a terrorist organization in 2008, 
PUDEMO has a larger and broader political base in comparison to Swaziland’s other political 
parties.  
PUDEMO was the only active political party in Swaziland between 1983 and 1996, and the 
absence of a credible alternative opposition party contributed to the growth inside PUDEMO of 
an attitude of being the sole legitimate voice of the Swazi opposition. This attitude unfortunately 
has spawned among some PUDEMO leaders and members a posture of intolerance toward other 
parties and activist organizations. PUDEMO has as a principal strategy the boycotting of 
elections.  Other parties and NGOs that favor participating in elections as a tactic come in for 
harsh criticism from some PUDEMO activists. 
PUDEMO became better known to the broader Swazi public in 1989 when the party circulated 
pamphlets in the urban areas criticizing the Swazi aristocracy. Then in 1990, senior PUDEMO 
members were accused in a high profile treason case. This case contributed to publicizing 
PUDEMO’s activities and objectives and broadened its support base. PUDEMO led opposition 
to a 1991 commission that reviewed the tinkhundla system.  
In February 1992, PUDEMO announced that it was unbanning itself, and that it would 
henceforth operate openly in Swaziland. The party launched a campaign of civil disobedience in 
January 1996 that demonstrated that it had an urban mass base among intellectuals, students, and 
workers. In May 2003, PUDEMO declared that its members would defend themselves with force 
from violent acts by government. The inflammatory language of the declaration stopped just 
short of calling for an armed struggle to overthrow the Swazi government. 
PUDEMO's constitution provides for multiple structures, including wings for women and youth. 
The People's Manifesto, which was adopted at PUDEMO's 4th general congress in 1996, 
emphasized the need to create a constitutional multi-party democracy with an elected and 
accountable government, and to promote economic growth, development, and the empowerment 
of citizens through a mixed market economy. Land administration should be placed in the hands 
of the state to ensure access to land and security of tenure and to avoid landlessness and 
squatting. The state should promote job creation and high levels of employment through 
partnerships with labor and capital. The manifesto also demanded universal compulsory 
education, respect for the right to life, primary healthcare that is free or subsidized by the state, 
tertiary healthcare that is affordable and the provision of shelter for all and especially for the 
disadvantaged. The manifesto also called for the promotion and development of Swazi culture 
and the observance and protection of basic human rights and the end of state repression. 
PUDEMO’s structures and alliances in youth organizations, trade unions, and civic groupings 
have been involved in contestations for prestige, space, and resources with other political parties 
and activist organizations. These contestations have resulted in disagreement within and among 
civil society groups and political parties and have most probably worked to the advantage of the 
king and his supporters. Recently, the chances for the newly formed Trade Union Congress of 
Swaziland (TUCOSWA) to develop into a broad-based union federation have been weakened 
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due to a combination of sabotage by the Swazi government and PUDEMO’s influence over 
TUCOSWA’s leadership. 
PUDEMO has established solidarity relationships with the African National Congress (ANC), 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist 
Party (SACP). PUDEMO was the only Swazi political party invited to the ANC national policy 
conference in December 2012.   
PUDEMO will boycott the 2013 elections. On the question of a future form of government for 
Swaziland, Mario Masuku has said recently this will be decided at a time in the future when the 
people of Swaziland will be free to express their will.  
Sive Siyinqaba - Sibahle Sinje 
Sive Siyinqaba – Sibahle Sinje was initially launched as a cultural group with the objective of 
protecting Swazi culture from western influences and pushing back against PUDEMO. The name 
‘Sive Siyinqaba’ means ‘nation united’ (implying that it is united around the king) and ‘Sibahle 
Sinje’ means ‘we are beautiful as we are, with our culture and traditions’.  
The party initially campaigned to discredit PUDEMO as a threat to the institution of the 
monarchy and to influence Swazis to reject demands for reforms advocated by other political 
parties. The attempt to position Sibahle as the defender of the institution of the monarchy was 
complicated by the king’s opposition to the existence of political parties generally and to a 
conflict between the king and the Sibahle Sinje secretary general, Marwick Khumalo, whom the 
king suspected of being in a relationship with one of his wives. King Mswati’s opposition to 
Sibahle Sinje was so strong that he even fired his long-time private secretary and political 
advisor, Sam Mkhombe, when he suspected Mkhombe of having a connection with Sibahle.  
Mkhombe is now a Sibahle public relations officer. The enmity between King Mswati and 
Khumalo reached an open confrontation in 2004 when Khumalo was elected speaker of the 
House of Assembly and the king instructed him to resign as speaker or else leave parliament. 
After a short stand-off, Khumalo resigned the speakership.   
Sibahle Sinje has continued to make positive overtures towards the king and cabinet. Relations 
between the two camps have improved to the point whereby the idea of setting up a rival royal 
political party, in response to Sibahle Sinje, appears to have been abandoned by the royal family. 
Prince Guduza, one of Mswati’s half- brothers and the most recent House of Assembly speaker, 
is part of Sibahle’s senior leadership. During the 2013 elections, it is expected that Sibahle will 
receive support from traditional authorities and the government. 
Despite the ban on the participation of political parties in elections for the House of Assembly, 
Sibahle hoped to field candidates in 30 of the 55 tinkhundla constituencies. 
Swazi Democratic Party (SWADEPA)  
SWADEPA was formally launched on 24 September 2011.  It is Swaziland’s youngest political 
party, but the party president and secretary general, Jan Sithole and Archie Sayed, are both well-
known figures with a support base is the Swaziland Agricultural, Plantations and Allied Workers 
Union (SAPAWU). Sithole also has longstanding connections to international labor bodies and 
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to African Union and UN organizations. He is experienced in leveraging these connections 
against the Swazi government.  
SWADEPA has emerged with an agenda for political participation in the 2013 elections as a 
challenge to the Swazi establishment. SWADEPA’s slogan is ‘ngeke sibayekele’, connoting ‘On 
to them! We will be all over them and no space must be given away.’ This might resonate well 
with Swazis who have not seen benefits from election boycotts and who are frustrated with the 
country’s political impasse. 
SWADEPA sees itself as a party that can break barriers. It reasons that leadership should be 
about exerting influence, and it says that those who are absent have no chance of exerting 
influence. In anticipation of the September 2013 elections, SWADEPA was focusing its efforts 
on the promotion of universal suffrage through civic education aimed at persuading all Swazis to 
register to vote. SWADEPA states it has members in all constituencies.  They see registration as 
important because once a significant number of Swazis are registered it will be possible to 
determine the strength of support for the different parties and platforms. SWADEPA’s president 
states that the party’s overall strategy is to exploit the officially sanctioned undemocratic 
processes to push Swaziland in a more democratic direction.  
Inter-party relationships  
Ideologically there are only minimal differences between PUDEMO and NNLC. Weightier 
differences are due to personality clashes in competition for the title ‘liberator of Swaziland’.  
Both PUDEMO and NNLC have the same position on non-participation in voting. Absent the 
liberator title competition, there could be a better working relationship between NNLC and 
PUDEMO than either could have with SWADEPA or Sibahle Sinje.   
There appears to be some chance that PUDEMO and NNLC might reach agreement on a 
framework of cooperation leading to the restructuring of the Swaziland United Democratic Front 
(SUDF) to accommodate the concerns of NNLC. SUDF is a civil society umbrella group with 
the publicly declared purpose of unifying all the voices for change in Swaziland. There is 
however a strong perception that SUDF is dominated by PUDEMO affiliated trade unions and 
civil society groups. This perception of SUDF as PUDEMO’s cat’s paw was strengthened by the 
recent decision of the Executive Committee of the newly formed Trade Union Congress of 
Swaziland (TUCOSWA) to join SUDF despite opposition from one of TUCOSWA’s main 
members, the Swaziland National Association of Teachers, whose president is a former NNLC 
office holder.  
Given SWADEPA’s policy of participation in the upcoming elections, and due to a history of 
enmity between the SWADEPA and PUDEMO leaders, it is unlikely that SWADEPA will be 
invited to join SUDF or would join if invited.  
Sibahle Sinje and SWADEPA are both chasing the same constituency – one that hopes to assure 
the king that the monarchy’s needs and interests would be protected under any future 
administration governed by them.  
Although the SWADEPA president, Jan Sithole, was previously a high profile labor leader in 
Swaziland, SWADEPA has of yet gained support from only one trade union, SAPAWU.  Both 
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Sibahle Sinje and SWADEPA have failed to attain Southern African regional endorsement and 
support whereas PUDEMO has strong support from the South African Congress Alliance. 
However, in this regard Sithole has a clear advantage over the Sibahle leaders.  Over many years 
he has been widely known in Southern Africa and beyond as a crusading Swazi labor leader and 
he probably can still benefit from contacts that he formed during that time.  
Given the relative strengths of SWADEPA among workers and Sibahle among traditionalists, it 
seems probable that each will win seats in the next parliament. The fact that the other two more 
prominent and established parties will not participate will help both SWADEPA’s and Sibahle’s 
chances. Of course the value of party members holding parliamentary seats might not be very 
high. Although Sibahle and NNLC members are among MPs in the current parliament, they have 
not functioned as party caucuses, and it seems unlikely that the authorities would permit a 
political party caucus to operate in the next parliament. Also, the ability of parties to hold onto 
their MPs will be tested by the monarchy’s ability to distribute cash and favors. Sibahle has 
indicated that royal largess has enticed Sibahle MPs in the current parliament away from the 
party.   
SWADEPA acquired Danish Socialist Party funding for its campaign, and the party has devoted 
considerable effort to train its candidates. This means SWADEPA candidates will probably be 
better prepared for the polls compared to Sibahle candidates.  Civil society organizations 
In Consolidating Democratic Governance in the SADC Region: Swaziland, (Electoral Institute of 
Southern Africa, 2008), Patricia Joubert, Zwelibanzi Masilela, and Maxine Langwenya described 
the degree of effectiveness of civil society in Swaziland as follows: ‘Civil society in Swaziland is 
weak, fragmented and largely unable to access and influence decision making procedures both at 
national and local levels…. This generalization is particularly true for elections and electoral 
matters.’ Regrettably, this assessment continues to be valid 5 years later. 
Trade unions 
Membership numbers reported by the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) rose to 
83,000 workers in 21 unions covering a broad spectrum of occupations ranging from agriculture, 
construction, mining, and manufacturing to employment in banking, tertiary educational 
institutions, town councils and the public service. The Swaziland Federation of Labor (SFL) 
which broke away from SFTU in 1994 reported it had 12 affiliates and 20,000 members in 
manufacturing, IT, retail, finance, media and other occupations. 
Like other pro-democracy groups in Swaziland, trade unions have been forced to operate in an 
environment of repressive laws, hostile government attitudes and state sponsored violence. 
However unlike other pro-democracy groups, trade unions have had a legal basis from which to 
operate provided by various Industrial Relations Acts which have been in effect since before 
independence and which define rules for the collective negotiation of terms and conditions of 
employment and dispute resolution mechanisms.  
 
Swazi trade unions have also benefitted from international connections through their affiliation 
first with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and, beginning in 2006, with the 
ICFTU’s successor, the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). These linkages are 
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powered and protected by an international legal framework, based on International Labor 
Organization (ILO) conventions and the ILO’s complaint system, which have provided the 
Swazi trade union movement with opportunities of bringing international attention to abuses 
committed by the Swazi government.  
Over the past 5 years, Swaziland has been one of a very small number of countries placed under 
a special paragraph in annual reports of the ILO.  A special paragraph is the ILO’s most stringent 
sanction against a government. Swaziland continues to be cited for denial of rights guaranteed 
under ILO convention 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize), 
which Swaziland has ratified. The ILO has repeatedly sent missions to Swaziland that have 
reported back on the government’s non-compliance with convention 87 as well as crimes by 
government agents against union activists including intimidation, kidnapping, unlawful entry 
into and search of homes, torture and death while in detention.   
The ILO’s annual International Labor Conferences in Geneva have placed Swaziland 
government delegates in an unaccustomed position of having to sit quietly and listen to Swazi 
activists’ criticisms of the government’s policies and actions. In 2002 during an ILO conference, 
a Swazi government delegate, a senator from the upper house of parliament, publicly threatened 
the secretary general of the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions.  
TUCOSWA 
The Trade Union Congress of Swaziland (TUCOSWA) was founded in March 2012 bringing 
together the SFTU and the SFL and including also the Swaziland National Association of 
Teachers (SNAT), Swaziland’s largest union with 9,000 members. The association of SNAT 
with TUCOSWA was significant due to SNAT’s organizational strengths and history of success 
in bringing out its members for strikes and public demonstrations.   
At TUCOSWA’s founding congress, a resolution was taken that ‘the current system of 
Government in Swaziland is one that is undemocratic, repressive and dictatorial and that the 
Federation shall cause for a total boycott of the national elections in 2013 unless the elections are 
held under a multi-party system’. This was an openly political pronouncement. Some in civil 
society, including the SNAT president, objected to what they viewed as undue influence from 
one political party. They also objected to a decision by the TUCOSWA president to associate 
TUCOSWA with the Swaziland United Democratic Front (SUDF), perceived as a PUDEMO 
affiliate. The SNAT president, who said she adheres to the principle that labor unions should be 
independent of political parties, withdrew SNAT and its financial support from TUCOSWA, 
leaving the federation in a precarious financial situation. Subsequently, the SNAT president’s 
decision to withhold funds from TUCOSWA has sparked disagreements within SNAT that have 
weakened SNAT. 
The Swazi government issued TUCOSWA with a registration certificate on 25 January 2012. 
Following TUCOSWA’s boycott resolution at its March congress, on 4 April the Attorney 
General advised the Swazi Commissioner of Labor that the registration of TUCOSWA was 
annulled. The Attorney General stated that TUCOSWA was not a trade union organization as 
envisaged by the Industrial Relations Act and further that the Act does not provide for the 
registration of federations. The latter point was specious in that other federations, including the 
Federation of Swaziland Employers, have long been registered under the same act.  
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Since April 2012, the Swazi government has not reconsidered the decision to deregister 
TUCOSWA, and labor leaders expected TUCOSWA will continue to be in limbo through the 
2013 elections. At present, there is no national labor centre recognized by the government of 
Swaziland, and as a result tripartite negotiations structures cannot function. TUCOSWA 
complained to the ILO that the government’s denial of the freedom of association ‘has reached a 
point that has not been reached before’. 
Non-governmental organizations focusing on democratic governance and human rights 
Around 70 non-governmental organizations are affiliated with the Coordinating Assembly of 
Non-Governmental Organizations (CANGO). The official regime governing NGOs has been 
described by Joubert, Masilela, and Langwenya as ‘loose’. NGOs are under the administrative 
ambit of the Ministry of Home Affairs; however they are required to register with the Ministry of 
Justice and Constitutional Affairs. Registration is governed by Section 21 of the Companies Act 
of 1912. Only a small number of the registered NGOs focus on democratic governance and 
human rights. 
Coordinating Assembly of Non-Governmental Organizations (CANGO)  
CANGO initially focused on health care, but its constitution was amended in 1987 to encompass 
all NGOs working in development, which includes work on democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law. CANGO’s current programs emphasize building NGOs’ capacity to engage the 
Swazi government on policy. CANGO’s vision is ‘An empowered and vibrant civil society for 
social justice’.  
In 2003, CANGO led the formation of an NGO Electoral Support Network consisting of 15 
Swazi NGOs. In partnership with the Johannesburg based Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 
(EISA), the Support Network recruited and trained 108 Swazi election observers to cover all 
constituencies during the 2003 elections. This was an important manifestation of an appropriate 
role of civil society in elections. Then there was a set-back during the 2008 elections when the 
Swazi Elections and Boundaries Commission limited accreditation to only 10 observers.   
The CANGO director stated that 5 CANGO affiliates are active in democracy and governance 
work.  The director wants to encourage more organizations to join CANGO’s Human Rights and 
Governance Consortium. Current Consortium affiliates are the Council of Swaziland Churches, 
the Media Institute of Southern Africa, Women in Law in Southern Africa, the Young Women’s 
Network and Save the Children. The director is critical of civil society for neglecting to offer 
more civic education courses for rural people relating to democracy and human rights. He hopes 
to attract organizations to join the Consortium from among NGOs that focus on agriculture and 
HIV/AIDS.  
Some CANGO members, including the Swaziland Red Cross, World Vision, Population Services 
International and the Swaziland Conference of Churches keep their distance from democracy and 
human rights activism. Donor prohibitions on foreign aid recipients forbidding them from taking 
positions on Swazi political matters create a barrier to some organizations from getting involved 
in civic education for their clients. Despite the obvious linkages between the conditions which 
humanitarian projects address and the lack of accountability of governance in Swaziland, many 
organizations continue feeding the hungry and caring for the sick without addressing the root 
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causes of poverty and extreme neediness. The CANGO director commented that in current 
conditions of limited political awareness among the general population, particularly rural people, 
many recipients of humanitarian aid view the aid as a gift from the king.   
Swaziland Coalition of Concerned Civic Organizations (SCCCO) 
The rule of law crisis in 2003, along with a growing socio-economic crisis, led to the founding of 
SCCCO bringing together the Federation of Swaziland Employers and the Chamber of 
Commerce, the Association of the Swaziland Business Community, the Federation of Trade 
Unions, the Federation of Labor, religious denominations, the Law Society of Swaziland, the 
Swaziland National Association of Teachers, Lawyers for Human Rights and the Swaziland 
chapter of the Media Institute of Southern Africa as well as women's groups and other non-
governmental organizations. The Coalition is the broadest civic organization in the country, and 
it has a capacity to reach a wide spectrum of Swazi people. SCCCO seeks to listen to and be 
responsive to the grassroots while promoting acceptance of basic democratic values and respect 
for human rights. 
SCCCO offers support to all political parties which seek to achieve democracy through peaceful 
means. The Coalition believes that the key need in Swaziland is the empowerment of people 
through civic education that allows for all voices and opinions to be heard. Ideally, every view 
should be openly debated and contested, and the people should be able to decide what course of 
action makes the most sense for their country.  
All Swazi political parties are based in urban centers, and rural people usually have not been well 
represented in political discourse. With a view towards assuring a better urban-rural balance in 
political discourse, SCCCO works to expand contacts with rural people and to provide civic 
education aimed at helping disadvantaged people learn skills for acquiring and exerting influence 
in their home communities.  
SCCCO seeks to sustain an integrated approach in all levels of its contacts built upon community 
engagement and education; national and international advocacy campaigns; and promoting unity, 
focused engagement and mobilization within and among all pro-democracy organizations.  
SCCCO’s coordinator is a respected Swazi elder with contacts at multiple levels throughout 
Swaziland. He contributes a weekly column on governance and related issues to the Times of 
Swaziland, the country’s most widely distributed newspaper. 
 
Council of Swaziland Churches 
The Council of Swaziland Churches, formed in 1976, includes 9 denominations of mainstream 
Christian churches such as the Anglicans, Methodists, and Lutherans. The Council’s general 
secretary stated that Swazi Christians, who make up around 90 per cent of the population, are 
divided roughly among 3 groupings: one quarter are in the Council’s member churches, one 
quarter are in Evangelical churches, and one half belong to independent churches which are 
indigenous to Swaziland and Southern Africa. The general secretary stated that Evangelicals 
refuse to become involved in political issues because their interpretation of scripture views 
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government as divinely installed and not to be challenged. The general secretary estimates that 
most pastors and members of the 9 Council affiliated denominations would favor multi-party 
democracy for Swaziland while 90 per cent of independent church pastors and a majority of their 
members would oppose multi-party democracy. He cautioned however that the rapidly growing 
size and importance of the youth cohort in the Swazi population present an opportunity for a 
major shift in these positions in the direction of greater support for multi-party democracy.   
The Council of Swaziland Churches is a fellowship of the World Council of Churches. The 
vision of the Council of Churches is to enable member churches to develop themselves, their 
communities, and their nation spiritually and physically in a just and sustainable way. Its mission 
is to further the unity of God’s church as a body of Christ by developing strategies that will 
enable the membership to advocate for justice and peace in all circumstances and dealings. 
Swaziland United Democratic Front (SUDF) 
The Swaziland United Democratic Front was formed in 2008 as a coalition of pro-democracy 
groups including political parties, unions and churches. The founding membership included 
PUDEMO, NNLC, Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions, Swaziland Federation of Labor, 
Swaziland National Association of Teachers, Swaziland National Union of Students, Swaziland 
Association of Students, Swaziland National Ex-Miners Workers Association and the Coalition 
of Informal Economy Association of Swaziland. The founding of SUDF was the result of a 
growing conviction that in order to create a strong civil society that could work actively for 
democratization and poverty eradication, there would have to be more unity and coordination 
among the civil society organizations of Swaziland. SUDF aims to increase the space for 
democratic participation for and by the socio-economically and politically marginalized people 
of Swaziland. SUDF is generally viewed as a PUDEMO affiliate, and this perception has 
negatively affected SUDF’s success in bringing about unity in Swazi civil society. 
Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) 
Established in 1997, OSISA has projects in 10 southern Africa countries including Swaziland.  
The organization’s work in each country is different according to local conditions and needs. 
OSISA is part of a network of autonomous Open Society Foundations located in Eastern and 
Central Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, 
Southeast Asia and the United States. 
In Swaziland, OSISA collaborates with other organizations on issues surrounding the rule of law, 
democracy building, human rights, economic development, education, the media and access to 
technology and information. OSISA's varied activities share a common goal of reducing poverty, 
HIV/AIDS and political instability.  
OSISA's vision is to promote and sustain the ideals, values, institutions and practices of open 
society, with the aim of establishing vibrant and tolerant southern African democracies in which 
people, free from material and other deprivation, understand their rights and responsibilities and 
participate actively in all spheres of life. OSISA’s approach involves looking beyond immediate 
symptoms in order to address deeper problems focusing on changing underlying policy, 
legislation and practice.  Depending on issues and circumstances, OSISA supports advocacy 
work by its partners in Swaziland or joins partners in advocacy on shared objectives and goals. 
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In other situations, OSISA directly initiates and leads in advocacy interventions. OSISA also 
intervenes by facilitating initiatives and partnerships, through capacity-building and through 
grant-making. 
Foundation for Socio-Economic Justice (FSEJ) 
FSEJ was founded in 2003 as an umbrella organization with a primary vision of initiating broad 
civic education programs to encourage democratic participation and raise awareness on human 
and constitutional rights among the rural population of Swaziland. The primary goal of FSEJ is 
to help build a solid and unified, mass based democratic force. FSEJ is active in civil society 
networks that focus on social, political and economic issues. FSEJ also works together with the 
following strategic partners: Lawyers for Human Rights, Swaziland National Union of Students, 
Swaziland Economic Justice Forum, Street Vendors Association, Swaziland Labor Academy and 
Swaziland National Ex-Mine Workers. FSEJ maintains a strong working relationship with the 
Swaziland United Democratic Front.  
Church Forum on HIV and AIDS  
The Church Forum works with church programs to assist victims of HIV / AIDS and orphans 
and to provide education for community service in support of support groups and home based 
care. The Forum supports 90 church based neighborhood care points throughout Swaziland 
which help HIV/AIDS victims through food resources development and psychosocial support. 
The Forum presently is working toward the construction and staffing of 35 permanent 
neighborhood care point structures to be distributed throughout the 4 regions of Swaziland.  
Constituent Assembly of Civil Society in Swaziland 
The director of the Church Forum is also the convener of the Constituent Assembly of Civil 
Society in Swaziland which includes both NGOs and political parties with the aim of offering 
Swazi opposition groups opportunities to talk together about eventual talks with government 
authorities and to prepare the opposition for actual dialogue with the authorities when this 
becomes possible. 
Two noteworthy Swazi civil society organizations work outside Swaziland. They are: 
Swaziland Solidarity Network (SSN) 
The SSN originally consisted of Swazi opponents of the regime, mostly affiliated with 
PUDEMO, and South African activists and freedom fighters who came to know the problems of 
Swaziland while being based there during the struggle for freedom in South Africa. SSN, which 
has been proscribed in Swaziland, operates from Johannesburg as a repository and distributor of 
news and opinion relating to Swaziland and particularly to the misdeeds of the king and the 
government. 
Swazi Diaspora Platform 
The Swazi Diaspora Platform was launched in 2011 with its principal aim being to give all 
Swazis based outside Swaziland a space for reflection, engagement and open dialogue about the 
situation in Swaziland. It seeks to coordinate communication by Swazis in the diaspora and 
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others who wish to share ideas including defining specific roles that can be assumed by the 
diaspora community. The Diaspora Platform’s website states that it shall ‘create a space for 
constructive and coordinated action for Swazis in the diaspora to engage, reflect and reach out 
towards contributing to alternative sustainable development models in Swaziland. This shall be 
done through promoting a culture of human rights, people-centered-development and respect for 
the environment.’ The Platform is based in Johannesburg and Nelspruit. 
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Annex 2. Tibiyo Taka Ngwane’s holdings in the Swazi economy 
 
Tibiyo’s operations are secretive, but the limited information available in Tibiyo annual reports 
reveals the extraordinary reach which Tibiyo has achieved throughout Swaziland’s economy. 
Tibiyo Agriculture owns about 55% of the entire Swazi sugar industry which is estimated to be 
worth more than E3 billion. Tibiyo has a 53 per cent shareholding equity in the largest sugar 
group, Royal Swazi Sugar Corporation; 40 per cent of Ubombo Sugar; 55 per cent of the 
Swaziland Sugar Association assets, and substantial lands under cane cultivation in Big Bend, 
Tshaneni, Simunye, and Mhlume. 
Tibiyo Estate Hotels and Hospitality owns and controls 40 per cent of Royal Swazi Sun Group, 
the largest hotel group in Swaziland, and 100 per cent of Royal Villas. Tibiyo also owns 40 per 
cent of Bhunu Mall, 25 per cent of Simunye Shopping Plaza, and various housing estates and 
commercial properties. 
Tibiyo Mining owns and controls 50 per cent of the Dvokolwako Diamond Mining Company, 25 
per cent of Maloma Coal Mining, and 80 per cent of Langa Brick and Tile Manufacturing. 
Tibiyo Foods owns and controls 40 per cent of Swazi SAB breweries and 26 per cent of Parmalat 
Milk and Cheese Processors. 
Tibiyo Shipping and Insurance Broking owns and controls 41 per cent of Alexander Forbes Risk 
Management and 35 per cent of Manica shipping. 
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Annex 3. Full text of the 1973 proclamation 
 
PROCLAMATION TO ALL MY SUBJECTS - CITIZENS OF SWAZILAND 
 1. WHEREAS the House of Assembly and the Senate have passed the resolutions which have 
just been read to us. 
 2. AND WHEREAS I have given consideration to the extremely serious situation which has 
now arisen to our country and have come to the following conclusions: 
 (a) that the Constitution has indeed failed to provide the machinery for good government and for 
the maintenance of peace and order; 
 (b) that the Constitution is indeed the cause of growing unrest, insecurity, dissatisfaction with 
the state of affairs in our country and an impediment to free and progressive development in all 
spheres of life; 
 (c) that the Constitution has permitted the importation into our country of highly undesirable 
political practices alien to, and incompatible with the way of life in our society and designed to 
disrupt and destroy our own peaceful and constructive and essentially democratic methods of 
political activity; increasingly this element engenders hostility, bitterness and unrest in our 
peaceful society; 
 (d) that there is no constitutional way of effecting the necessary amendments to the Constitution; 
the method prescribed by the constitution itself is wholly impracticable and will bring about that 
disorder which any constitution is meant to inhibit; 
 (e) that I and all my people heartily desire at long last, after a long constitutional struggle, to 
achieve full freedom and independence under a constitution created by ourselves for ourselves in 
complete liberty without outside pressures; as a nation we desire to march forward progressively 
under our own constitution guaranteeing peace, order and good government and the happiness 
and welfare of all our people. 
 3. Now THEREFORE I, SOBHUZA II, King of Swaziland, hereby declare that, in collaboration 
with my Cabinet Ministers and supported by the whole nation, I have assumed supreme power in 
the Kingdom of Swaziland and that all Legislative, Executive and Judicial power is vested in 
myself and shall, for the meantime, be exercised in collaboration with a Council constituted by 
my Cabinet Ministers. I further declare that, to ensure the continued maintenance of peace, order 
and good government, my Armed Forces in conjunction with the Swaziland Royal Police have 
been posted to all strategic places and have taken charge of all government and all public 
services. I further declare that I, in collaboration with my cabinet Ministers, hereby decree that: 
 (a.) The Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland which commenced on the 6th September, 
1968, is hereby repealed; 
 (b.) All laws with the exception of the Constitution hereby repealed, shall continue to operate 
with full force and effect and shall be construed with such modifications, adaptations, 
qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring them into conformity with this and 
ensuring decrees. 
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Annex 4. Full text of the 2012 ACHPR resolution on Swaziland 
 
Swaziland has been the subject of several resolutions of the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights, the most recent of which was passed in May 2012. The resolution text follows: 
‘Recalling its mandate to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in Africa pursuant to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter); 
 Underscoring the provisions of the African Charter, in particular; Articles 9, 10, 11, 13, and 
18(3), as well as other international human rights instruments, including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), and the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa; 
 Deeply Concerned about allegations of the violation of the right to freedom of expression, 
freedom of assembly, and freedom of association which, if true, may affect the conduct of free, 
fair and credible elections in 2013; 
Further Concerned about the allegation of the violations of the rights of workers as seen in the 
de-registration of the recently formed Trade Union Congress of Swaziland (TUCOSWA) by the 
Office of the Commissioner of Labor acting on the advice of the Attorney General of the 
Swaziland Government;  
Alarmed by the failure of the Kingdom of Swaziland to implement the decision of the African 
Commission in Communication 251/2002- Lawyers for Human Rights v Swaziland, and the 
recommendations in the report adopted by the African Commission following a promotional 
mission to the country in August 2006; 
                    i.            Calls on the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland to respect, protect 
and fulfil the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of assembly 
as provided for in  the African Charter, the UDHR, the ICCPR and other international and 
regional instruments;  
                 ii.            Calls on the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland to implement the 
decision of the African Commission in Communication 251/2002- Lawyers for Human Rights v 
Swaziland and submit a report on the status of implementation; 
               iii.            Calls on the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland to implement the 
recommendations in the report adopted by the African Commission following a promotional 
mission to the country in August 2006; 
               iv.            Further urges the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland to take all 
necessary measures to ensure the conduct of free, fair and credible elections in 2013.’ 
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Annex  5. Description of the MTN saga and the no confidence vote 
 
The appointment in 2008 by King Mswati of Barnabus Dlamini, who was not a member of 
parliament, as prime minister was another of King Mswati’s violations of the constitution.   
Chapter VI, paragraph 67, (1) states that  ‘The King shall appoint the Prime Minister from 
members of the House acting on a recommendation of the King’s Advisory Council.’ 
In October 2009, the parastatal Swaziland Posts and Telecommunications Corporation (SPTC) 
proposed to sell its 51 per cent holding in Mobile Telephone Networks (MTN) Swaziland in 
order to raise funds to expand SPTC’s mobile network coverage in the country. SPTC’s plans 
were blocked, reportedly by the king who wanted to protect the Swaziland mobile phone market 
for MTN. The king also was reported to block a deal for the sale of SPTC’s MTN shares so he 
could increase his holdings in MTN while purchasing SPTC’s shares at a lower cost. 
In 2012, Prime Minister Dlamini, also an MTN shareholder, ordered SPTC to switch off its 
Fixedfones and data components which left thousands of people with expensive and useless 
gadgets and without mobile phone service. The prime minister claimed that he was required to 
take this action by Swazi and international court decisions, but the facts did not support his 
claim. SPTC’s tariffs were lower than those of MTN, its only licensed competitor in Swaziland.  
The elimination of SPTC from the Swazi mobile phone market effectively forced the nearly 
700,000 Swazis who rely on mobile phones to use MTN’s more expensive service. A public 
outcry reverberated in the lower house of parliament, the House of Assembly, which on  3 
October 2012 passed a vote of no confidence in the prime minister and the cabinet by more than 
the constitutionally prescribed 2/3rd majority of all members of the House. This was the first and 
only no confidence vote since the 2005 constitution came into effect.  
Chapter VI, paragraph  68, 1 (e) of the constitution states that ‘after a resolution of no confidence 
in the Prime Minister is passed by at least two thirds majority of the members of the House, the 
King removes the Prime Minister’. However the prime minister did not resign and the king did 
not dismiss him.  
Prime Minister Dlamini was reported in the Times of Swaziland as saying, ‘We will just ignore 
the vote of no confidence and carry on with our business as usual.’  The attorney general, 
Majahenkhaba Dlamini, declared the no confidence vote ‘null and void’, and Brigadier Fonono 
Dube of the Umbutfo Swaziland Defence Force told media that the Constitution was worthless 
because it had not been formally presented to the United Nations.   
Civil society activists called for the prime minister and cabinet to resign, accusing ministers of 
violating the Constitution and undermining the rule of law. The Federation of the Swazi Business 
Community backed the call for the government to resign stating ‘This Cabinet has no mandate to 
govern, is not fit for purpose and it must do the honorable thing and go immediately before it 
damages Swaziland any further.’ A Federation spokesman said ‘The introduction of these new 
services brought real competition into the telecommunications sector. This enabled ordinary 
people to begin to afford to communicate more and the business community to access new 
markets and improve their services, competitiveness and profitability. As one of the poorest 
countries in the Southern African Development Community region, we had long suffered from 
monopoly pricing and were charged the highest rates for [communications] services.’ 
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After 12 days of stand-off and following threats and bribes directed towards MPs, the House 
voted to rescind its no confidence vote. A month before, 25 year old Princess Sikhanyiso 
Dlamini, King Mswati’s eldest daughter was appointed to MTN Swaziland’s board of directors. 
A Swaziland based investment consultant commented:  'All big companies in Swaziland have to 
accommodate royal family members to their boards. The princess’s appointment signals that the 
time has come for a new generation to enjoy that privilege.’ 
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